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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS:

TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: THE CHANGING
TERRORIST THREAT
______________________________________________________________________________
On September 8, 2011, the American University National Security Law Brief and the Law and Government Program at
American University’s Washington College of Law hosted a candid discussion on the changes throughout the American legal system in the 10 years since the tragic September 11th attacks. The event featured a keynote address from Michael Leiter, Director
of the National Counterterrorism Center from 2007-2011, followed by a panel discussion with John Carlin, Principal Deputy
to the Assistant Attorney General of the Department of Justice’s National Security Division; Ivan Fong, General Counsel at
the Department of Homeland Security; Stephen Vladeck, Professor of Law at American University Washington College of
Law; Ken Anderson, Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law; and Dan Marcus, Professor of
Law at American University Washington College of Law.

INTRODUCTION:
PROFESSOR JAMIE RASKIN: Good Day, everybody. My name is Jamie Raskin. I’m the
director of the Program on Law and Government and I’m delighted to welcome everybody here on
behalf of the Program and also the National Security Law Brief, which is co-sponsoring this event
with us.
I will turn this over to my distinguished colleague in the Program on Law and Government, a
Fellow in Law and Government, Dan Marcus, who has a distinguished career in public life and was
the Chief Counsel of the 9/11 Commission, which is perhaps the most relevant experience he’s had
to today’s talks. So please welcome Dan Marcus.
PROFESSOR DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Jamie. Today’s program is co-sponsored by the
National Security Law Brief, which is a young but vibrant publication on National Security Law here
at the law school. The editor in chief of that publication who did a lot of work on today’s program,
can’t be here today for a very good reason. He’s starting an externship at the National Security Division at the Department of Justice and is currently in orientation there.
%XW,GRZDQWWRUHFRJQL]HWZRRWKHUKLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFLDOVRI WKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\/DZ%ULHI 
who are here today. Sally Gnat, who did a lot of work on this program as well, and Vince DeFabo.
Thank you both very much. I also want to say a word of thanks to the indispensable Melissa de Beer
RI WKH2IÀFHRI 6SHFLDO3URMHFWVZKRGLGHYHU\WKLQJXQGHUWKHVXQWRPDNHWRGD\·VHYHQWKDSSHQ
One other thing I want to mention before introducing our keynote speaker, is that the law school is
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going to have a brief memorial ceremony tomorrow morning at 10 am to honor and remember the
victims of the 9/11 attacks in the courtyard in front of the law school.
9/11 is one of watershed events that has changed our view of the world. Some would say it’s
changed our view of the world too much, but it certainly has changed our view of the world. It has
also changed the focus of our government and our politics in the United States. The President and
VHQLRUJRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVLQFOXGLQJWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDODQGRWKHUVHQLRURIÀFLDOVRI WKH-XVWLFH
Department, now spend a lot of time on national security and counterterrorism issues. We now have
a completely reorganized and much larger intelligence community. We’ve got a new national security
division in the Department of Justice, and we have a whole new Department of Homeland Security just down the street. And in law schools throughout the country, not just here at WCL, national
security and counterterrorism law have become an integral part of the curriculum.
Now we’re very fortunate to have as our keynote speaker today someone who is uniquely qualiÀHGWRDVVHVVWKHWHUURULVWWKUHDW\HDUVDIWHU0LFKDHO/HLWHUDV\RXFDQVHHIURP\RXU
speaker biographies, has a resume that’s even better than mine. It’s certainly more unusual. After
KHJUDGXDWHGIURPFROOHJHKHVSHQWVL[RUVHYHQ\HDUVDVD1DY\SLORWÁ\LQJPLVVLRQVWRSROLFHWKH
No-Fly Zone in Iraq after the Gulf War. Then he went to law school, where he became president
of the Harvard Law Review. Then he was a law clerk for Mike Boudin, an old friend of mine, Judge
Boudin, on the First Circuit, and Justice Breyer. Then he became a government lawyer, an Assistant
U.S. Attorney, in the eastern district of Virginia.
In 2004, he became the Deputy General Counsel of a commission. Not the 9/11 Commission.
This is where I met Mike Leiter. I was General Counsel of 9/11 Commission, he was the chief
lawyer for a commission with a really long name. It was sort of the “how we screwed up the intelligence on WMD in Iraq” commission. And then he became Deputy Chief of Staff to the Director
of National Intelligence and also served in the important position as a guest speaker in my National
Security Law class here. Then in 2007 he became the Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which he’ll probably tell you a little more about. And then in 2008 he was
QRPLQDWHGE\3UHVLGHQW%XVKDQGFRQÀUPHGWREHWKH'LUHFWRURI WKH1&7&ZKHUHKHVHUYHGXQWLO
a couple of months ago. And he’s one of the few Bush Administration appointees, presidential appointees, who was kept on by President Obama, who perhaps was impressed that he had been, that
Mike had been president of Harvard Law Review. I’m sure there were other reasons.
Okay, so with that, Mike is now, as the former director of the NCTC, perhaps a little freer to say
what he thinks about the terrorist threat to the United States than he was when he was in the government. And it’s a real privilege to have you here, Michael.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
MR. MICHAEL LEITER: Thank you. Folks, it’s a pleasure to be here and thank you Jamie
and Dan for that introduction. Dan and I really do have a lot in common, probably more than he
understands because people often ask me how I got into intelligence and national security. And I’d
say, well I worked on this commission, and before I could even get out the name of the commission
they’d say, oh you were on the 9/11 commission? And I’d say, no it was another one. And they’d
always go, oh. So Dan, I’ve actually stopped and now I’m just lying and saying I was on the 9/11
Commission and taking credit for all of your work. And I will also note that although Dan’s name
for my commission is probably a catchier one, I think in legal terms that would be a bit like leading the witness on direct examination if the name was “how did we screw up the intel for the Iraq
WMD?” That’s where we came out in the end, Dan, but we couldn’t quite start there.
It’s a pleasure to be here. And this week, I’ve been speaking at a number of places but this is
special for me because I’ve known Dan for so long. Dan helped me so much in breaking into this
DUHD$QGDOVREHFDXVHLW·VP\QHLJKERUKRRG,OLYHIRXURUÀYHEORFNVDZD\DQG,WKLQNIRUSHRSOH
who live in and around Washington, and for those who live in and around New York, two blocks
from Ivan’s headquarters at Homeland Security, so close to the Capitol and the White House, so
close to the Pentagon - yesterday I was at NYU and so close to site of the World Trade Center - it is
really impossible to recreate the sense of that day. And I can’t try to recreate that for you but I ask
that as we delve into some of the legal and policy issues that sprouted over the past 10 years, it is unbelievably important not to dwell and never get past those events, but keep those events somewhat
central in our thinking. Because that emotional gut-level response, again, is not a perfect line from
the decisions we make afterwards, but it does help inform or explain some of those decisions and I
think it also helps us understand the ways in which government has to perform before an action in
order to avoid the appropriate scorn of the public if the public is not protected.
And if you need another reminder, just this morning - I’ve obviously been watching some of
the TV like everyone else - I’ll tell you that there’s a fabulous piece on the New York Times website.
This is not a paid political announcement. There’s a fabulous piece with a series of audiotapes that
were recently release from various people involved with trying to track down the planes. Oh, maybe
it was a paid political announcement because I see Eric Schmitt from the New York Times coming
in right now. But it’s a fabulous way to bring yourself back to that moment, much like the footage
does to some extent. To bring yourself back to the level of confusion and the lack of understanding.
And that confusion and fear and lack of understanding, of course, continued on after the day and
again guided lots of our reaction.
People talk about 9/11 as a sort of awakening. I want to talk about three major topics today.
One, I do want to talk about the threat. Second, I want to give you a sense, my perspective, and
FXUUHQWRIÀFLDOVOLNH,YDQDQG-RKQ&DUOLQFDQJLYH\RXWKHLUVHQVHRI ZKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWLVGR-

116

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 2, No. 1

ing now, but I want to give you a sense of how I think we tackled terrorism over the past 10 years.
$QGKRQHVWO\,WKLQNWKDWLW·VSUHWW\WKHUH·VVLJQLÀFDQWFRQWLQXLW\LQKRZZH·YHGRQHLWRYHUWKHWZR
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV$QGWKUHH,·PJRLQJWRRIIHUP\RZQUHÁHFWLRQVWKDW,KRSHWKHQOHDGWRDVHWRI 
questions from people other than Eric Schmitt, from the students and the faculty and the members,
so we can delve into some of the tough issues that are associated with terrorism today. So I’ve got
about 25 minutes and then we’ve got as long as we have until Dan pulls me off.
Before I go too deep, though, let me just toss out a few numbers and statistics so we remember
in some ways, in simple ways, in the ways that numbers can explain but they don’t convey emotions,
the costs of 9/11. That day, of course, almost 3,000 people killed, more than Pearl Harbor. Out of
that, we launched two major land wars. Depending on which numbers you look at, certainly more
than 100,000 Iraqis killed, certainly more than – I would guess – 200,000 civilians killed total in those
two wars. Now, more than 6,000 American soldiers killed in those two wars. Hundreds of billions of
GROODUVVSHQW$QGGHSHQGLQJRQKRZ\RXVOLFHWKHSLHZHQRZVSHQGPRUHWKDQELOOLRQD\HDU
on various aspects of counterterrorism in the United States.
In 2010, 10 years after 9/11, roughly 13,000 people across the globe were killed in terrorist
incidents. About 70 percent of those, more than 7,000, were killed by Sunni extremists, generally
RUJDQL]DWLRQVDOLJQHGZLWKDO4DHGD7KHÀYHFRXQWULHVZKHUHWKH\ZHUHNLOOHGPRVWRIWHQWKHPRVW
were killed I should say, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and India. A pretty big drop off from
Somalia to India. And who is being killed by Sunni Islamic extremists? Other Muslims. Out of those
13,000 people who were killed by terrorists in 2010, about 340 were killed in the Western Hemisphere. 340 out of thirteen thousand. When I refreshed my recollection on that number it reminded
me a little bit about our greatest generation, which obviously was a tremendous generation and we
DOZD\VWDONDERXWÀJKWLQJRQWKH:HVWHUQ)URQWLQ:RUOG:DU,,TXLFNO\IRUJHWWLQJWKDWWKH6RYLHW
8QLRQORVWSHRSOHWRRXUHYHU\DQGWKDWWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RI ÀJKWLQJZDVRQWKH(DVWHUQ)URQW
And although we as Americans, I think appropriately, focus on the cost of terrorism to us and to the
Western Hemisphere, only 340 people out of 13,000 last year killed by terrorists were in the Western
Hemisphere.
Since 9/11, a total of 14 people have been killed in the United States by al-Qaeda-associated
terrorists, or al-Qaeda-inspired terrorists. Fourteen. In the course of this two-hour program, more
Americans will be killed in car accidents than all the Americans killed by terrorists in the United
States inspired by al-Qaeda in 10 years. Now I’m not trying to make pure equivalency there. But I
think some of these numbers are very important to put in perspective the threats we face.
So, what is the threat? On 9/11 we faced a hierarchical organization centered in Afghanistan
that obviously had not started in 2001; it had begun years before that with Osama Bin Laden declaring a Fatwa against the United States and the West. Al-Qaeda attacked us of course before 9/11.
Attacked us in Kenya and Tanzania. Attacked us in Yemen. They at least claimed responsibility for
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some actions in Somalia. But on 9/11 the picture clearly changed with the death of 3,000 Americans
here. And at that point it changed both for us and frankly it changed for the organization that was
al-Qaeda.
Although it was a hierarchical organization then, over the past 10 years, what launched those
attacks in 2001 has, thanks to United States and Allied efforts, been not completely but at least in
3DNLVWDQVLJQLÀFDQWO\UHGXFHGDQGWRVRPHH[WHQWGHFLPDWHG7KHUH·VQREHWWHUH[DPSOHRI WKDWRI 
the success that the United States had, then back on May 1st with the killing of Osama Bin Laden,
the only person who ever led al-Qaeda. And in my view the only individual who stood out from the
organization in a way that spoke to a population and to some extent got past the concrete horror of
al-Qaeda. And still, to some extent, to some symbolized something good even if they weren’t supporting his actions, but a man who was standing up against the West. Today, as I said, that al-Qaeda
is decimated and that is a, in my view, a uniformly good thing. But of course, as we decimated alQaeda in Pakistan, al-Qaeda has gone on and has changed. And I keep referring to you, Eric, this
is what happens when you show up for my speeches, if you want some great writing on that from
people like Eric and Tom Shanker - 10 percent right Eric? - and many others, talking of the morphing of al-Qaeda. And it certainly has.
We still have a hierarchy but that hierarchy is now distributed and there are now hierarchies in
places that there weren’t on September 11th. The instability in Yemen has bred and helped foster an
organization of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula which has attempted at least two attacks against
the United States. My personal favorite, the Christmas Day bomber, followed by the attempt to blow
XSWZRFDUJRÁLJKWVWUDYHOLQJWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHRUJDQL]DWLRQNQRZQDV$O6KDEDDELQ6RPDOLDWKDWKDVDWWHPSWHGWRDVVRFLDWHLWVHOI ZLWKDO4DHGDDQGDOWKRXJKLW·VZRUNLQJUDQNDQGÀOHSUREably does not have transnational views, its leadership certainly does. The organization al-Qaeda in
North Africa that has attacked U.S. and Western interests and U.N. interest in Algeria and Mali and
Mauritania. And of course, what is most troubling to many Americans, the specter of homegrown
H[WUHPLVWVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$OODJDLQZLWKWKDWVLJQLÀFDQWFDYHDWWKDW,·YHSRLQWHGRXWEHIRUH
that in 10 years we have tragically lost 14 Americans in the Homeland to al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism; but it is still a real threat. And certainly in 2009–2010, the United States experienced an uptick
in that threat of homegrown extremism, which has put many people on edge. Of course the failed
Times Square bomber, Najibullah Zazi who was driving from Denver to New York City likely to
attack the New York City subway system, and many others that you’ve read about in the news . . . or
haven’t read about in the news.
At the same time this is going on, there has been something else which has been happening,
which I think in many ways is far more important than the trajectory of al-Qaeda, and that is what
we saw beginning earlier this year in the Arab Awakening. And what we saw was regimes throughout
the Middle East falling, not to al-Qaeda as it once aspired to do, but instead to, with differing levels
of violence, relatively peaceful protest and the downfall of regimes that have governed this region
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and these countries for decades. And in that Arab Awakening we, again, did not see a strong hand
from al-Qaeda; we saw just the opposite. We saw a level of irrelevance to its ideology that, I think,
KDVVLJQLÀFDQWO\XQGHUPLQHGWKHLGHDWKDWDO4DHGD·VLGHRORJ\KDVEURDGEDVHGDSSHDO
Throughout all of this, the U.S. Government has changed constantly. And we can talk more
about these threats in the questions. I don’t want to dwell there because frankly I think that’s where
most people think every day. People generally read the paper and they have a sense of what that
WKUHDWORRNVOLNH,I \RXKDYHPRUHTXHVWLRQV,·PKDSS\WRÀHOGWKHP%XWZKDW\RX·UHOHIWZLWKDQ
RQJRLQJ\RXVWLOOKDYHDÁXLGSLFWXUH<RXKDYHDÁXLGSLFWXUHZKHUHDO4DHGD·VQRWJHWWLQJ3DNLstan, poses a risk to our troops in Afghanistan, poses a transnational threat, a network in different
places of the world. But ultimately al-Qaeda, in my view, is weaker. And what I mean by weaker,
FRPSDUHGWRLVDO4DHGDLVOHVVDEOHWRLQÁLFWWKHW\SHRI GDPDJHLWGLGLQ6HSWHPEHU
Now that of course is part because of the enemy and it is part because of what the U.S. Government has done and that’s what I’d like to move to now.
So, what have we done? And I say “us” as in all of you, because all of you have also been part of
the steps that the U.S. Government and the state governments and the local governments have done
to combat this threat. I will put our actions into four basic categories. Now, I know these aren’t the
perfect categories and I also know that they’re not the categories espoused in the President’s current
strategy for counterterrorism, but I think they capture things in relatively clear ways that people, I
hope, understand. First, there’s an offense. Second there’s a defense. Third, there’s a long game. And
IRXUWKZHOOWKHUH·VNLQGRI WKHZLOGFDUGDUHDVDQGEXFNHWVWKDWGRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRP\RWKHUWKUHH
nice, neat categories.
What have we been doing on offense? Well, I think quite clearly, and again I’m not here to defend decisions made in prior administrations, but clearly to those who made the decision launching
the wars certainly in Afghanistan and also in Iraq were designed to reduce the terrorist threat. But
WRGD\DOWKRXJKFHUWDLQO\WKHÀJKWFRQWLQXHVLQERWKFRXQWULHVWKH86SUHVHQFHLQ,UDTLVUDSLGO\
diminishing and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is slowly diminishing. And we are left with offense
there. But that’s not the only offense I’m talking about.
I’m also, without getting indicted, talking about the offense which occurs when there are explosions in places like Pakistan caused by U.S. strikes. I’m also talking about offense in the sense of
domestically what the men and women of the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI do
when they go out offensively to disrupt terrorists’ plots and arrest people. Having lived through
two administrations, I have to tell you – and this might meet with chagrin from both sides – but not
much has changed. If anything – and President Obama, in my view, has been far more aggressive
with the use of targeted U.S. force – I personally believe, although there are probably those in this
room who would disagree, that it has been done in accordance with International Law, U.S. Constitutional Law, and traditions of warfare. And in doing so, the United States Government has taken
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RII WKHEDWWOHÀHOGWHUURULVWVZKRFDQQRWEHGHIHDWHGDQ\RWKHUZD\,·PÀQHZLWKGLVTXRWLQJWKH
phrase, the global war on terror. I think there are huge disadvantages to using that phrase. But what
,·PQRWÀQHZLWKDQG,ZLOOÀJKWYRFLIHURXVO\IRULVWKHLGHDWKDWVRPHRI WKHSHRSOHZHDUHÀJKWLQJ
will not be persuaded, will not be arrested, will only be stopped from harming Americans when they
are killed. This does not, I think, make me bloodthirsty; it makes me somewhat pragmatic. And having spent the better part of half a decade now studying from as many perspectives as I can, those
individuals who aspire to be in al-Qaeda or part of al-Qaeda, I think that the proof is in the pudGLQJ7KHUHDUHLQGLYLGXDOVRXWWKHUHZKRFDQQRWEHSHUVXDGHG7KHUHDUHHOHPHQWVRI WKLVÀJKWWKDW
require targeted violence, and that targeted violence, like many other uses of targeted violence for
the United States in the past, is a good one.
Domestically that gets a little harder. And I think many of the current issues that we face today
are involving the use of offensive tools domestically. And again, I want to stress when I say offensive tools domestically those are not the same tools. They are the use of law enforcement. They’re
the use of intelligence tools within the United States. And I think many of the opening questions we
have in this society about what kind of security we want still rest in that query. But in my experience,
and again probably to the chagrin to some in this room, the Bush Administration and the Obama
$GPLQLVWUDWLRQKDYHQRWVWUD\HGVLJQLÀFDQWO\IURPRQHDQRWKHULQWKHLUGRPHVWLFDFWLYLWLHV7KHUHDUH
very hard questions on the domestic front about when individuals who aspire to violence should be
stopped. But largely, those decisions, Bush to Obama, those decisions were discussed in the same
thoughtful way and pursued in the same thoughtful way. Some of the tools were not the same, but
the decisions really did come out from roughly the same place.
So that’s my short and dirty on offense. Now defense. And before I delve too deeply into deIHQVHOHWPHVWUHVVWKDWDOOWKHVHGRÀWWRJHWKHUWKH\GRQRWZRUNLQGHSHQGHQWO\'HIHQVLYHO\\RX
all know the defense. Who here hates taking off their shoes when they go to the airport? Please
pass my thanks to Janet Napolitano, Ivan, for telling me that I’m not going to have to do that in the
future, and more importantly that some of the people around me will not have to do that in the
future. Who here who gets so annoyed and thinks it’s so stupid that everyone has to take their shoes
off, remembers Richard Reid in 2001 attempting to blow up a transatlantic airliner with bombs in
his shoes? Who here can’t stand the fact that they can’t get a big tube of toothpaste in their carry-on
when they’re traveling? Let’s just remember in 2006 al-Qaeda tried to use liquid explosives hidden in
sports drink bottles to kill potentially more than 3,000 people.
These defensive pieces have their drawbacks; they certainly have their annoyances and they have
more than that in some cases. But I think as a general matter again, and I can only say this from the
perspective of the Bush to the Obama administration, these defensive measures have been relatively
FRQVWDQW$QG,FDQDOVRVD\ZLWKXWPRVWFRQÀGHQFHWKHVHGHIHQVLYHPHDVXUHVKDYHKHOSHGVWRSDWWDFNV<RXNQRZWKH\·UHQRWSHUIHFWDQGDJDLQWKDW·VZK\DOOWKHVHSLHFHVÀWWRJHWKHU%XWWKH\KDYH
PDGHLWPRUHGLIÀFXOWIRUYHU\LQQRYDWLYHEDGSHRSOHWRNLOO$PHULFDQVDQGRWKHUV/HW·VXVHWKHH[-
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ample of the underwear bomber. Everyone says it was a failure. There are certainly aspects of it that
ZHUHDVLJQLÀFDQWIDLOXUH%XWSDUWRI WKHUHDVRQWKDWWKDWERPEGLGQ·WZRUNOLNHO\ZDVWKDWDO4DHGD
had to construct a weapon that got past these very defensive measures that we had taken. None of
these measures will stop terrorism. These measures in combination will help reduce the likelihood
of a catastrophic attack. And that is ultimately what I believe the American people should demand
of their government.
1RZIRUERWKRIIHQVHDQGGHIHQVH,GRQ·WZDQWWRVD\WKDWHLWKHURI WKHVHGRQ·WKDYHVLJQLÀcant negative effects in other parts of our efforts. In particular, the long game. Now what I mean
by the long game is battling the ideology that attracts recruits to al-Qaeda. Do I think that strikes in
Pakistan do not, to some extent, alienate Pakistanis, anger members of the international community,
and potentially drive some recruits to al-Qaeda? Of course I don’t. Those are some of the negative repercussions of an offense. Do I think that when an individual who is trying to study in the
United States to attain a law degree, an undergraduate degree, or to become an engineer who is coming from Saudi Arabia or Jordan, whose name happens to have Mohammad in it and is subject to
extensive screening for their Visa; do I think that that might not anger people and alienate them and
make them feel less supportive of what we consider American values? Of course I don’t. Of course
I know that these actions can have some of those negative repercussions.
The question is not whether they have negative repercussions; the question is how you carefully
calibrate your offense and defense with these long-term goals. Because I wish that we didn’t have to
use strikes against terrorists. But if someone has a better way of stopping people who are plotting
attacks against the United States when a host nation is unable to do so, please offer it up. I haven’t
heard it in two administrations. When people, if people really have a better way and a big bureaucracy to avoid any potential mistakes in screening Visas and the like, please tell me because I haven’t
heard it in two administrations. This is not to defend any of these systems and say they cannot be
improved. But it is to say any actions we take will have some negative repercussions and we simply
KDYHWRÀJXUHRXWKRZZHFDUHIXOO\FDOLEUDWHWKRVHDQGWU\WRPLWLJDWHWKRVHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVZKLOH
pursuing the effects we’re trying to achieve with vehemence.
Which does lead me to the long game. And if you ask me now what has been weakest in the
U.S. efforts over the past 10 years, it is the long game in combating al-Qaeda’s ideology. I’ve got
good news for you, though. Al-Qaeda has done really well combating its own ideology. If you look
at the, you can look at a variety of polling numbers, but if you look at polling numbers from 2001,
2002, 2003, Osama Bin Laden was personally popular in a lot of countries in the world. And in
many of these same countries, the populations were actually reasonably supportive of suicide attacks
DVDOHJLWLPDWHWDFWLFWRÀJKWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV7KHQFDPHSHRSOHOLNH=DUTDZLLQ,UDT7KHQFDPH
al-Qaeda in Aman, Jordan, killing innocent people at a Muslim wedding. As the stories of al-Qaeda
and al-Qaeda violence spread and was not just targeting the United States, more and more people
WKURXJKRXWWKHJOREHDQGDJDLQWKLVLVFOHDUO\UHÁHFWHGLQDYDULHW\RI SROOLQJDO4DHGD·VLGHRORJ\
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Bin Laden as a person, al-Qaeda’s tactics have been increasingly rejected throughout the Muslim
world. But that doesn’t solve your problem. There are always going to be those few that embrace
this ideology. But as a general matter, we’re doing okay in the long game, not because of what we’ve
done, but because of what al-Qaeda has done.
Our ability to shape that, again I apologize for the phrase but I still haven’t come up with a
EHWWHURQHWKDWEDWWOHÀHOGRI LGHDVLVVRPHZKDWOLPLWHG7KH86·VFUHGLELOLW\HVSHFLDOO\WKHJRYHUQment’s credibility, is limited. How many people, I ask this all the time just because it’s fun for me,
I’m not sure it illustrates much, but how many people here have taken a class in Islam? Now raise
your hand if you’re, sorry to do this and you can refuse if you like, raise your hand if you’re over
40 and you took a class in Islam. That’s usually what happens. The United States Government, our
leaders, our people, do not understand Islam. Here’s another question for the crowd. What are the
two things you’re never supposed to discuss at a dinner party? Religion and politics. Try having an
intelligent conversation about al-Qaeda. We’re very uncomfortable talking about these things. We
don’t know the issues well. We don’t understand most of the countries well where most of al-Qaeda
adherents are coming from. How many people have been to Yemen in this room? I don’t necessarily
recommend it, especially right now.
A lack of understanding; a lack of comfort discussing these issues; the lack of credibility that the
United States Government has; the ways in which the United States Government generally communicates - white guys like me standing up in a press conference versus tweeting and Facebook and
YouTube - all of these factors, not to mention in my view the general lack of funding to the organizations in the United States Government who need to do this work as compared to the Department
of Defense, mean that the U.S Government remains, I think, less well postured than we should be to
help defeat al-Qaeda’s ideology.
/DVWEXWQRWOHDVWRQWKHKRZDQGWKHQ,·PJRLQJWRJRWKURXJKWKHUHÁHFWLRQVTXLFNO\DQG,
actually will for once hit my 30-minute window I think. If I were a practicing lawyer I would go over
VLQFH,JHWSDLGE\WKHKRXU6RUU\'DQ7KRVHVSHFLDODUHDVWKDWGRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRWKHRIIHQVH
GRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRWKHGHIHQVHGRQ·WTXLWHÀWLQWRWKHORQJJDPH7KLQJVOLNHFRPEDWLQJWHUURULVWDFcess to weapons of mass destruction. Enabling our partner nations to combat terrorism because we
FDQ·WGRLWDORQHDQGWKH\FDQGRLWEHWWHUWKDQZHFDQ$QGÀQDOO\WKHVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJHVWKDWZH·YH
had here domestically within our own system to make sure organizations like the National Counterterrorism Center that I led, the FBI and Department of Justice that John Carlin spent so much
time with, Department of Homeland Security that Ivan is a huge part of, all of those pieces. And
those pieces have gone actually remarkably well. I was with Graham Allison on Tuesday night and I
mocked him incessantly because I think he’s frankly wrong, his predictions have been wrong about
terrorists, the likelihood of a terrorist WMD event. I think he’s been a bit of an alarmist in this area.
All that being said, nothing would change the game more than terrorists’ effective use of biological
or nuclear weapons. And this is a real and ongoing threat. And requires extensive resources both on
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the offensive and defensive and intelligence sides.
Nothing that we do is more important than enabling partners. And enabling our foreign partners, not to mention state and local partners, but most importantly - enabling our state, local, tribal
and foreign partners to do the things that the U.S. Government can’t and shouldn’t do, and enabling
them in a way that they are still doing their terrorism work, consistent with American values. And
that I will tell you can be a tough line to walk, both on the domestic and on the foreign side.
1RZORRNLQJEDFNLQWKUHHPLQXWHVKRZGR,UHÁHFWRQDOORI WKLV"+RZ·VLWJRQH"2YHUDOO,
really do think with some notable exceptions, it’s gone pretty well. Again, the numbers don’t help tell
the story, but if I had gotten this group together on September 12, 2001, and asked everyone how
many more Americans will be killed in the United States in the next 10 years, I would put money
on the fact that none of you would say 14. I would guess none of you would have said 140. I would
guess most of you would’ve said something closer to 1,400. And that is a remarkable success. With
the enormous caveat that we still have to think about all the other costs that have been associated
ZLWKWKHÀJKWWKDWZH·UHHQJDJHGLQ
6HFRQG,ÁDWO\UHMHFWWKHQRWLRQWKDW$PHULFDQ·VFLYLOOLEHUWLHVKDYHEHHQGUDVWLFDOO\LQIULQJHG
upon in the past 10 years. That is not to say, let me stress in the strongest possible terms, that things
that I don’t support and things that I wish haven’t happened didn’t happen. But I think if we look
at the scale of the things that happened, and we get past the bumper stickers, and we get past the
DFFXVDWLRQVDQGORRNDWWKHIDFWV,EHOLHYHWKDWZHKDYHDVDJHQHUDOPDWWHUSXUVXHGWKLVÀJKWFRQsistent with American traditions, the best American traditions. And we have a structure within our
JRYHUQPHQWZKLFKKDVVWLOOLPSRVHGDVLJQLÀFDQWOHYHORI RYHUVLJKWWKDWDYRLGVPDQ\RI $PHULFDQ·V
fears. Now it’s really hard to convince people of that because they think a lot more is going on than
there is and that’s a good thing if you’re a terrorist. I want the terrorists to think that. But if you all
think that the government is listening to all your phone calls and reading all your e-mails, if only, our
job would be a whole lot easier. Or I should say my former job would have been a whole lot easier.
It simply isn’t happening. And bombastic accusations don’t help us have an intelligent conversation
about those areas that are really open to sensible debate in my view.
:HKDYHORVWDGHJUHHRI JOREDOVXSSRUWLQWKLVÀJKWRYHUWKLVSDVW\HDUVDQGWKDW·VUHDOO\D
problem. Now, some of that global support, more of that global support is there than people think.
Because the ways in which intelligence organizations and security organizations continue to work
WRJHWKHUHYHQZKLOHHOHFWHGRIÀFLDOVLQYDULRXVFRXQWULHVVD\,ZLOOÀJKWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,ZLOO
never let them do this, please come help us with this, is remarkable. And what is often forgotten, is
WKH86*RYHUQPHQWKDVGRQHPRUHDQG,XQGHUVWDQGWKHUH·VDÁLSVLGHWRWKLVWRRZDUVLQ,UDTDQG
Afghanistan, but the U.S. Government had done more to help defend countries in Western Europe,
in the Middle East, in South Asia from terrorism than any other country on Earth. And we continue
to do that daily.
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7KUHHODVWTXLFNUHÁHFWLRQV,I \RXGLGQ·WNQRZLWEHIRUHWKHZRUOGLVDUHDOO\UHDOO\UHDOO\VPDOO
place. In 1994 after the Black Hawk Down incident, I think a lot of Americans kind of said, Somalia, let’s get the hell out of there and let’s not worry about it again. We don’t have the luxury to do
that. We don’t have the luxury to treat Yemen as a punchline in a Friends episode that it was in the
90s. Places like Yemen and Somalia really do matter to the security of the United States.
In the same way, and potentially even more importantly, we don’t have the luxury of making
the lead, it’s not even a luxury, we can’t if we want to be secure even get remotely close, as I fear
some have in some of the public debate over the past two, three years, get close to marginalizing the
American Muslim community. The American Muslim community is the single most important part
of helping avoid al-Qaeda’s ideology from taking root in the United States. They have fought it vehemently since 9/11, they have continue to partner across faiths and within their own communities
WRÀJKWDO4DHGD·VLGHRORJ\DQGZHFDQQRWUHPRWHO\OHWRXUVRFLHW\GULIWEDFNLQWR[HQRSKRELDDQG
treating anyone of any race, ethnicity, or religion as somehow an outsider. It is abhorrent and I fear
that it has made a comeback over the past couple of years.
Second to last. Technology’s great. I love my Smartphone; I love my iPad, also not a paid political announcement. Technology can also bring terrible destruction. And technology is getting more
and more accessible, and it will continue to get more and more accessible. As hard as it was for the
United States to create an atomic bomb in 1945, it’s gotten easier. More and more countries have it,
the materials are more widely available, the expertise is more widely available. Similarly for biological
weapons. This is not the most likely occurrence that we will face. And we have some ways to defend
against it. But should a nuclear or biological weapon be used by terrorists, all of the niceties that we
now talk about will go away very quickly.
/DVWEXWQRWOHDVWWKLVLVDJUHDWWLPHWRUHÁHFWEXWLWLVQRWLQP\YLHZWKHWLPHWRVWRS,W·VD
great time to address a lot of the hard questions that quite amazingly we haven’t answered in 10
years. What does our long-term detention policy look like? What kind of domestic security presence
do we want? And so on and so on and so on. But if people think that it’s all over, it certainly isn’t
RYHUJOREDOO\$QGOHW·VMXVWFKDQJHDIHZWKLQJVWKDWWKH86*RYHUQPHQWKDVGRQHDQGUHÁHFWRQ
how different this conversation would be had in 2006 even one of those planes had been blown out
of the air. Let’s change a few pieces of defensive work or failure on the operator’s part and say Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab did blow up a plane over Detroit on Christmas 2009. Let’s just imagine now
that some of the work that the FBI had done and DHS did and the New York Police Department
did hadn’t worked and Faisal Shahzad had blown up that car in Times Square. That shouldn’t drive
all of our decisions. But it has to inform the discussions we have 10 years later because the evolution
of terrorism has continued. It did not begin and end on 9/11 and it’s not going to begin and end in
2011. I very much thank this group for listening and most of you staying awake, and I’m very happy
WRÀHOGDVPDQ\TXHVWLRQVDVZHFDQVTXHH]HLQ
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DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you very much. I think we have time for just a few questions before
going onto our panel discussion. I’ve got a couple but I’m going to cede my question opportunity
to join, so does anyone have a question they’d like to ask. Step to the mike if you would. And if you
could tell us who you are?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What would you say is more important to our long-term efforts? Defeating al-Qaeda or separating the Taliban from the current Afghan administration?
MICHAEL LEITER: I actually think it’s very important for us to distinguish the two. It doesn’t
mean that both are not enemies of the United States. But I think our goal, with respect to both, has
to be quite different. I think our goal for al-Qaeda has to be defeat. We cannot live, we can live but
we can’t live happily and the way we should and Americans should expect us to live, with an ongoing
transnational threat from al-Qaeda. They’re not a group with whom we will negotiate.
Not being an expert on the Taliban, I think that the Taliban’s interests, there’s at least a good
argument to be made, but the Taliban’s interests are quite different from al-Qaeda’s. It’s not that
the two are not related but is there a way to ensure that the Taliban does not support transnational
terrorism? I’m am hopeful there is and if there is, then I think your approach to the Taliban immeGLDWHO\EHFRPHVGLIIHUHQWIURPDO4DHGD%HFDXVHWKHYHU\GHÀQLWLRQRI DO4DHGDLVDJOREDOZDURI 
terrorism. Al-Qaeda, no matter what we do, will not back down in that effort. The Taliban, again,
is linked, similarities and ideology, but I think their pursuits are not necessarily hand-in-hand, even
though al-Qaeda’s leadership, we have to remember, has of course pledged their own buy-out to
Mullah Omar in the Taliban. And certainly if you’re on the ground in Afghanistan, the Taliban is
DWWHPSWLQJWRNLOO$PHULFDQVROGLHUV7KDW·VZKRZH·UHÀJKWLQJ%XWWKDWLVWRPHVWLOOGLIIHUHQWIURP
an organization plotting, planning and trying to execute attacks against the Homeland or outside of
the region. The fact is we’ve lived with the Taliban for a long time before 9/11.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This kind of relates to what you said. Since I’ve learned that policies
have changed, at least in my view drastically since 9/11, I wonder if it’s gone up to a size that is simply unsustainable? I guess my question is, is there any way to make the intelligence community size
PRUHFRVWHIÀFLHQWEXWVLPLODUO\PRUHHIIHFWLYH"
0,&+$(//(,7(5:H·UHJRLQJWRÀQGRXWDUHQ·WZH">/DXJKWHU@,VWKHUHDQ\ZD\WRPDNHWKH
86*RYHUQPHQWPRUHHIÀFLHQWDQGVPDOOHU"7KHDQVZHULV\HV7KHUH·VQRZD\WKDWDIWHU\HDUV
WKDWWKHUHDUHQ·WLQHIÀFLHQFLHV:H·YHSRXUHGDORWRI PRQH\LQWRWKLV7DNHWKHPRVWHIÀFLHQWWDNH
*RRJOH,JXDUDQWHHWKHUHDUHLQHIÀFLHQFLHVDW*RRJOHWKHUHDUHLQHIÀFLHQFLHVHYHU\ZKHUHZKHQ\RX
get big organizations that have grown rapidly. The DNI, the Director of National Intelligence, is Jim
&ODSSHUQRZDQGWKH&RQJUHVVKDVHQRUPRXVFKDOOHQJHVLQIURQWRI LW:KLFKLVKRZGR\RXÀQG
WKDWLQHIÀFLHQF\ZLWKRXWGRLQJZKDWZHGLGDIWHUWKH&ROG:DU":KLFKZDVGHFLPDWHWKHLQWHOOLJHQFH
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community. We lost a complete generation of people, we lost huge capabilities and we didn’t have
the capacity to address a lot of global threats.
'RLQJWKDWLVQRWJRLQJWREHHDV\,WKLQNWKHUHLVVXIÀFLHQWVXSSRUWRQWKH+LOOIURPP\H[SHULence and in the administration. And I think in ongoing administrations that this won’t be hollowed
out but it is going to take some - you’re probably going to hit the bone on some of the cuts. I think
that can be done intelligently and the real issue is less how are we going to cut the budget, and what
Americans and what the Congress and what the administration expects its government to do? How
good do you want us to be? I’m sorry, how good do you want them to be? It’s not us anymore.
$QGLW·VJRLQJWRWDNHKDUGFKRLFHV,VRQH$PHULFDQNLOOHGE\WHUURULVWVZRUWKELOOLRQD\HDU"
Five? Ten? I don’t want to turn this into an actuarial game but there are going to be hard choices
about that because we’re going to have to take increased risk. We’re not going to cover all the same
places. We’re not going to address all the same domestic threats because we’re not going to have the
same people. And as long as the American people understand the risk that they’re buying, and the
Congress understands that risk, and then backs up the operators after the fact, let me hammer that,
if Congress buys into it and supports the operators after the fact, then I think that we can get to a
relatively good place. There are a lot of “ifs” in what I just said.
DANIEL MARCUS: Here’s my last quick question and it may not be such a quick answer. You
didn’t say much in talking about offense and defense about the intelligence value of our program of
interrogating detainees. And the - it’s an area where I think - I wonder what you can say at this point
about your view as to whether the value of that program outweighed the costs to the United States
in terms of undermining our values and alienating world opinion? And how we’re doing now, now
that we don’t seem to be capturing a lot of people. We’re killing them instead. Are we missing out on
a real intelligence opportunity? That’s an easy one.
MICHAEL LEITER: Yes. Where to start? First, this is one of those areas where I think it is
important to at least attempt, and again, not to decide any question, but bring ourselves back to
2001. 9/11 was a lighting bolt in a lot of ways. And one of the ways in which it was a lightning bolt
is it illuminated a very murky landscape for a split second and then it went away. And I don’t know
how many people have ever been outside in a lightning storm and you kind of don’t know your surroundings. And then a lightning comes up and you see lots of shapes. You’re not really quite sure
what you’re seeing, but you saw some things over there and some things over here. It turns out that
if you then were able to make it daytime and have perfect illumination, you’d see a really different
picture. And I think immediately after 9/11, we didn’t know what was out there.
And, not only did we not know what was out there in the form of al-Qaeda, but we weren’t well
SRVLWLRQHGDWWKDWSRLQWWRÀQGRXWPXFKDERXWDO4DHGD:HGLGQ·WKDYHWKHKXPDQVRXUFHVWKDWZH
have today in Pakistan and Yemen and elsewhere. We didn’t have the Signals Intelligence infrastructure to collect some of their communications. We didn’t know how they operated; we didn’t know
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their hierarchy; we didn’t know their tools. And we couldn’t simply turn on the light. What we were
going to do was illuminate that with individual candle after individual candle after individual candle.
And Dan, as you know, doing that takes a lot of time. It takes years to build up that base of understanding.
One of the pieces that was undoubtedly important in those early days to try to jump start, to at
OHDVWJHWDÁDVKOLJKWLI QRWDVSRWOLJKWZHUHLQP\YLHZLQWHUURJDWLRQV1RZOHW·VSXWWKDWLQDFRUQHU
for a second and distinguish the basic idea of interrogating. We interrogate people all the time and
LW·VMXVWÀQH)%,LQWHUURJDWHVWKHP'+6LQWHUURJDWHVWKHPVWDWHDQGORFDOLQWHUURJDWHV7KHQ\RX
have the question of how you interrogate them. So we can’t just dismiss the idea of interrogation
being valuable. Of course interrogation is of value.
And then we have to cut out some things that are really independent of what the specialized
interrogations of al-Qaeda senior level operatives were. Abu Ghraib was not that. No one in their
right mind should defend anything about what happened in Abu Ghraib. And Abu Ghraib was
not what was going on with senior al-Qaeda operatives in certain programs. Some of the abuses in
Guantanamo were not that program.
Now, then you get to that tough question of the tools that were used in that specialized interrogation program. And the one, I have my personal views about whether or not they constitute
torture based on my reading of various legal documents and my personal gut feeling, and the fact
that I was waterboarded when I was in Seal school in the Navy. Didn’t really enjoy it. In my view,
the unfortunate, the most unfortunate piece about this was that our three branches of government
did not come to a common understanding. Frankly in my view some elements of our branches of
government stood back and let the executive branch do things that after the fact they felt awfully
uncomfortable with when they were illuminated in the light of public discourse. And I think that’s
the unfortunate piece. That’s not the only unfortunate piece. That’s the systemic failure, that we have
a system of checks and balances. And then the executive branch can think something but there were
opportunities for other elements of the U.S. Government to weigh in before the fact and say, you
know what? This one’s making me queasy and I want to stop this. Would they have been successful? I don’t know. But it certainly didn’t happen to the extent I think in a well functioning system it
should have.
$WWKHWLPHLQWHUURJDWLRQVZHUHRI VLJQLÀFDQWYDOXH$VZHOHDUQPRUHDQGXVHGLIIHUHQWWRROV
WKH\EHFDPHRI VLJQLÀFDQWO\GHFOLQLQJLPSRUWDQFH'RHVRXUFXUUHQWVWUXFWXUHPDNHLWPRUHGLIÀcult to have people in custody and interrogate them than it was before? Yes. To me that’s one of the
open questions: what are our long-term detention plans? I don’t think we have a clearly enunciated
policy there.
So for me, there’s value in interrogations. I don’t have a sense, Dan - I really mean this - I don’t
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have a sense whether or not those techniques were the ones that got the good stuff. I think perfectly
reasonable arguments can be made on both sides. I will tell you in my experience talking to experienced interrogators from different nations, and here in the United States, I think there is a perfectly
good argument that some of that information if not all could’ve been obtained through alternative
means.
DANIEL MARCUS: Okay. I think we’d better quit now, now that we gave you the easy one.
Thank you again very much and please join me in thanking our keynote speaker, Michael Leiter.

PANEL DISCUSSION: COMBATING THE EVER-CHANGING TERRORIST THREAT
'$1,(/0$5&86,·PJRLQJWREULHÁ\LQWURGXFHRXUSDQHOLVWVZKRVHELRJUDSKLHV\RXKDYHLQ
\RXUPDWHULDOV$QGOHWPHLQWURGXFHÀUVWHYHQWKRXJKKH·VQRWJRLQJWRVSHDNÀUVWVRPHRQHZKR
is a surprise to most of you today. Lisa Monaco, who is the new Assistant Attorney General for the
National Security Division at the Justice Department, got summoned to a White House meeting at
WKHVDPHWLPHDVWKLVSDQHOODWH\HVWHUGD\DQGVRZHKDYHDWHUULÀFUHSODFHPHQWIRU/LVD1DPHO\KHU
alter ego, John Carlin, who is the principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the National Security Division and the Chief of Staff for the National Security Division. He had a similar job until
recently as Chief of Staff for Bob Mueller, the Director of the FBI, who I guess is going to continue as Director of the FBI for two more years in this unique twelve-year term. And I think, John,
this new job should be pretty easy for you, because the National Security Division is much smaller
than the FBI. So if you can run the FBI, you can run the National Security Division. John is a career
lawyer at the Justice Department. He started out in the honors program at the tax division prosecuting tax cheats. Then moved on to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney, before going to the FBI.
Next to John is Ivan Fong, who was a colleague of mine in the Clinton/Reno Justice Department. It seems like ages ago. Ivan was a Deputy Associate Attorney General at the Justice Department when I was there. We have two presidents of law reviews here today. Ivan was the president of
the Stanford Law Review and then was a law clerk for Judge Abner J. Mikvaon on the D. C. Circuit,
and then or Justice O’Connor. Then he went to Covington and Burling, and then he went to the Justice Department. Then he went to G.E., where he was a senior lawyer and then was the chief legal
RIÀFHUDW&DUGLQDO+HDOWKEHIRUHFRPLQJEDFNWR:DVKLQJWRQZKHUHKHEHORQJVWREHWKHJHQHUDO
counsel of the vast and sprawling Department of Homeland Security.
I won’t spend much time on our other two panelists because they’re very well known in this
EXLOGLQJ7KH\DUHWZRRI RXUGLVWLQJXLVKHGSURIHVVRUVZKRWHDFKDQGZULWHSUROLÀFDOO\LQWKH
national security law area. Ken Anderson. I guess I’m a late in life academic. Ken is a mid-career
academic and Steve Vladeck is a young academic. Ken teaches international law and business law
courses here and writes extensively on issues relating to the law of war and national security law.
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He’s a fellow at the Hoover Institution and at the Brookings Institution. So he’s got both ends covered. Steve Vladeck teaches constitutional law, federal courts and national security law here. He was
a law clerk for Judge Marsha S. Berzon on the 9th Circuit and Judge Rosemary Barkett on the 11th
&LUFXLWDQGLVDOVRDSUROLÀFZULWHULQWKHVHÀHOGV
Okay, with that introduction, I think we’re going to start with Ivan. We’ll have time for questions
ZKHQWKHSDQHOLVÀQLVKHG
MR. IVAN FONG: Thank you very much Dan. If it’s okay, I’ll sit with the panel because I
hope that this will be truly a panel and not a series of speeches and that we can have some dialogue
among the panel and obviously with the audience. First I want to thank again Dan, but also the
American University Washington College of Law for hosting this program. It’s a real privilege to be
here. Dan and I, as he indicated, have known each other for a long time and in fact, everyday when
,ZDONLQWRP\RIÀFH,KDYHDSODTXHWKDW,JRWZKHQ,OHIWWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI -XVWLFHDQG'DQZDV
the acting Associate Attorney General at the time. And so his name and his signature greets me every morning. I also want to thank the other panelists for being here. I think this is both a timely and
an important topic for us to talk about, which is combating the ever-changing terrorist threat and its
legal and policy issues.
What I thought I would say in my sort of ten minutes to start is really to set the stage in a way
VLPLODUWRWKHZD\0LNH/HLWHUGLG%XW,·PJRLQJWRWDNHDVOLJKWO\GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFK,·OOVWDUWÀUVW
with my bottom line. Bottom line up front, which is that in terms of the changes that have occurred
in the legal and policy realm in this area, I think a lot has changed. I think the United States has
PDGHVLJQLÀFDQWSURJUHVVLQVHFXULQJWKHKRPHODQGIURPWHUURULVPVLQFHWKHDWWDFNV%XWWKDW
said, much work remains. The threats persist and continue to evolve. I think that’s my jumping off
point which is how do we as a country, how do our legal institutions, how do the people who are on
the front lines and the policy makers, adapt to an evolving threat? And my basic proposition, and
this is I think appropriate for a law school audience, is that it’s not so much about changes in the
law, per se. I think we all are familiar with things like the USA PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which created the Director of National Intelligence and
the NCTC. The Detainee Treatment Act, the Military Commissions Act. There have been a lot of
laws, including the law that created the Department of Homeland Security. But to me, it’s really the
institutions and processes that have made the difference and that are the key to our continuing effort
to adapt. So let me unpack a little bit what I mean by that. So, starting with institutions, I think the
PRVWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHDQGLW·VWKHRQH,·PWKHPRVWIDPLOLDUZLWKLVWKHFUHDWLRQRI DQHQWLUHO\QHZ
cabinet department.
Ten years ago the Department of Homeland Security did not exist. In 2003 it stood up, bringing together 22 different federal agencies. It is now formed around seven operating components. I
always get asked what DHS does each day. I think to this day, there are still people who don’t quite
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XQGHUVWDQGRUNQRZKRZWKH\DOOÀWWRJHWKHUVRLI \RXUHPHPEHUQRWKLQJHOVHUHPHPEHUWKHVH
seven agencies. So it’s the three former immigration and naturalization service agencies. So, what
was formerly INS. So, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border ProtecWLRQV &3% DQG&LWL]HQVKLSDQG,PPLJUDWLRQ6HUYLFHV &,6 7KH\GRWKHLPPLJUDWLRQEHQHÀWVWKH
visas, the asylum applications and the like. Plus, FEMA, Coast Guard, TSA and the Secret Service.
So when you think about the breadth and the complexity of those agencies and the over-arching
missions, and so just to recap again, DHS’s missions, obviously, it’s the preventing and combating of
terrorism, which is the cornerstone mission. But also securing and administering the border; administering and enforcing our immigration laws; securing cyber space, which I’ll talk a little bit more
about later; and something that I think is a relatively new concept, but which I think is as important
as the offense and defense and long game that Mike Leiter referred too, and that is to promote and
insure resiliency in response to disasters of all kinds. And again, it’s something that I’ll come back to.
:KDWDERXWSURFHVVHVDQGSURFHGXUHV"7RPHWKHPRVWVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHVKDYHFRPHLQWKH
DUHDRI LQIRUPDWLRQVKDULQJ6R\RX·OOUHFDOOWKDWRQHRI WKHVLJQLÀFDQWÀQGLQJVRI WKH&RPmission was the stove piped nature of the intelligence community, the law enforcement community,
WKHÀUVWUHVSRQGHUFRPPXQLW\VWDWHDQGORFDOV:HKDYHPDGH,WKLQNGUDPDWLFLPSURYHPHQWVLQ
not just the actual sharing of information, but the culture in which those actors engage. To me, it’s
YHU\VLJQLÀFDQWIRUH[DPSOHWKDW'+6KDVIXVLRQFHQWHUV7KHVHDUHFHQWHUVZKHUHIHGHUDOVWDWH
local law enforcement come together to share intelligence information. The suspicious activity report initiative to standardize how state and local law enforcement collect and share information. The
new national terrorism alert system. So you recall the old color-coded system has now been replaced
E\DPXFKZHWKLQNEHWWHUV\VWHPWKDWLVPXFKPRUHVSHFLÀFPRUHFRQFUHWHLQWKHIRUPRI ZKDWLV
the threat, what actions people can take and most importantly, has an automatic sunset provision, so
that we are not constantly under some very high state of alert.
The Secretary of Homeland Security is fond of saying that homeland security begins with hometown security. And that means that in terms of information sharing, we all play a role. You’ve probably seen signs across Amtrak or elsewhere that talk about “if you see something, say something.”
If you look at the plots here in the U.S. that have been disrupted, most of them have involved some
member of the public who alerted somebody in law enforcement. And I could go on. The interQDWLRQDOHIIRUWVDWVKDULQJLQIRUPDWLRQDQGIRUPDOL]LQJWKRVHUHODWLRQVKLSVKDYHEHHQVLJQLÀFDQWDV
well. So to me, that is a huge change and a huge improvement.
A second area we’re all familiar with, aviation security, I think a lot of the changes occur behind
the scenes. A lot of them have to do with the screening of passenger identities before people board
the plane. Establishing global aviation security standards. Increasing the security at our ports as well
as surface transportation. Using risk based methods to do a better job of screen and identifying potential threats. Making better use watch lists and more intelligent use to avoid over extending in that
area. You may have read about plans to increase the trusted traveler program. Which would again
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EHPRUHULVNEDVHGDVRSSRVHGWRRQHVL]HÀWVDOO7KHODVWWKLQJ,·OOVD\EHIRUH,LGHQWLI\WKHVRUWRI 
handful of legal issues that I see down the road, has to do with cyber security. It’s, I think, the area
that I, one of the areas that I am most concerned about. In part because it is so new, it presents
PDQ\GLIÀFXOWOHJDODQGSROLF\LVVXHVDQGEHFDXVH,WKLQNZHDUHSUREDEO\PRUHYXOQHUDEOHLQWKLV
area than we should be.
DHS has done a lot. We have rolled out a cyber intrusion detection system for the .gov domains.
So DHS’s role is to protect the government networks. We have stood up a national cyber security
and communications integration center that integrates threat information and shares it and distributes it. We have entered into groundbreaking agreements with the defense department to share personnel information resources so that we can be truly partners in this effort. We have also established
a cyber incident response plan. We have conducted exercises. So there are a lot of things that we are
doing, but as I said, it’s an area that remains a challenge for us in the government.
The issues, I’ll start with the obvious, I think the over arching theme of the program, evolving threats. I mentioned cyber, I would add to that something that Mike Leiter mentioned, which is
the issue of home grown violent extremists and how to address that threat. Soft targets and the use
of improvised explosive devices. So, very small-scale attacks that require very little planning, don’t
provide much advance notice, and so to the extent that we have better intelligence, we have better
capabilities, those really are directed towards the larger scale plots that take often years to develop.
It’s the smaller ones that can cause just as much psychological harm that I think is something that we
need to continue to adapt too.
And that leads me to the point that I had mentioned earlier about resilience, and something that
Mike Leiter mentioned, and that is the extent to which we have as a society had to be prepared, that
we’re not going to be perfect. That we cannot guarantee 100 percent security. And that given enough
time, any system is going to have some failure and that we need to prepare ourselves for some kind
of attack or incident. Not something we want, we will do everything possible to prevent, but we as a
country need to be resilient, we need to bounce back, we need to go on, we need to continue to do
the things we are doing, rather than let an incident really bring us down as a country. And so I think
that’s a long-term very important goal that requires a lot of work.
Other legal issues. I mentioned earlier a focus on prevention. And I think prevention is very
different from our traditional law enforcement approach, which is a crime or some wrongdoing occurs and we have well-established procedures and capabilities for responding. Preventing is and can
EHPRUHGLIÀFXOWDQGRQHDVSHFWWKDW'+6LVSDUWRI DQG,·PVXUHZH·OOKHDUDERXWRWKHUVIURPWKH
FBI and Department of Defense side, is the concept of pushing out our borders. That the physical
ERUGHUVDFWXDOO\RXJKWWREHDODVWOLQHRI GHIHQVHQRWDÀUVWOLQHRI GHIHQVH$QGVRVRPHRI WKH
work that we’ve done in cooperation with our foreign partners to insure better visa screening, to get
more intelligence, all is about this concept of pushing our borders out. And that, of course, raises
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legal questions about extraterritorial [ph] applicability, about the rights of non-U.S. citizens and U.S.
citizens who are abroad, and the importance of partnership agreements.
The third major issue, of course, is privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. I think it is an area
that not only we, the lawyers, but the Department as a whole, is deeply committed to protecting. We
KDYHDVWDWXWRULO\FUHDWHGGHGLFDWHGRIÀFHIRUSULYDF\DQGVHSDUDWHO\IRUFLYLOULJKWVDQGFLYLOOLEHUWLHV
7KRVHLQGLYLGXDOVDVZHOODVP\RIÀFHDUHLQYROYHGLQDOOPDMRUGHFLVLRQVDQGZHKDYHYHU\IXOOURbust, frank conversations about how proposed courses of action may affect privacy and civil liberties
and civil rights. And they’re very much taken into account in the decision making process.
Last couple ones I’ll mention. The role of the private sector, we haven’t talked much about that
so far. Much of our infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. Certainly our cyber infraVWUXFWXUHEXWDOVRFKHPLFDOIDFLOLWLHVWKHHOHFWULFJULGWKHZDWHUVXSSO\RXUÀQDQFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV
And so we at DHS have as really one of our important missions, the outreach and the coordination
with the private sector and in turn, our message to the private sector, which is that you have to be
SUHSDUHG,WKDVWREHDFRUHFRQÀGHQFHWKDW\RXUHVSRQG\RXSUHYHQWMXVWLQWKHVDPHZD\WKHJRYHUQPHQWGRHVWRGD\6RWKDWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWFKDQJHDVZHOO,WUDLVHVOHJDOLVVXHVJRLQJIRUZDUGDERXW
FULVLVUHVSRQVHVSODQVGRLQJH[HUFLVHVDQGGULOOV,W·VHOHYDWHGWRWKH&KLHI ([HFXWLYH2IÀFHU&KLHI 
5LVN2IÀFHU%RDUGRI 'LUHFWRUOHYHO6RLWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWLVVXHIRUWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU
And then I’ll close with a note that may be closer to home and that is to talk about the future
and the way we adapt is by having great talent. And one of the things that I have talked, as I go
around speaking on this topic, is the need for law students such as you, and law schools such as
WCL, to really promote and invest in a homeland security law curriculum. It’s something that can
start with very basic courses in constitutional law, administrative law, international law and then
building block courses in areas that are more specialized in homeland security such as maritime law,
maybe even aviation security law, or cyber security law, national security law. And then I would envision a capstone course called homeland security law. And we actually piloted for our lawyers, our
new lawyers, a course on homeland security law. And so every lawyer that comes to DHS, within
WKHLUÀUVW\HDU\HDUDQGKDOIZLOOJRWKURXJKDZHHNORQJVHVVLRQRUVHPLQDUWKDWZLOOLQWURGXFHWKHP
to all the different parts, not only of what DHS does, but some basic legal issue spotting sessions
WRKHOSWKHPVHHWKHLQWHJUDWLRQRI KRZWKHSLHFHVÀWWRJHWKHU6R,ZRXOGHQFRXUDJH\RXWRWKLQN
about that, to consider offering more sequence in this area. Maybe you do already. But that combining the academic study with an internship or a practical experience at DHS. So my closing pitch is
to consider DHS as a place to work. We have an honors program. It’s a great program and we need
talent like yours. We need the best and the brightest to help us solve and help us address the emerging threat that we face.
DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Ivan. John?

132

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 2, No. 1

MR. JOHN CARLIN: I think Ivan’s next job might be as the dean of a homeland security law
program. I want to keep my remarks brief in part because others have already touched on them and
also to encourage the dialogue among the panel. I thought the name of the topic for this discussion
was interesting. The “Ever-Changing Terrorist Threat.” I think in talking about an ever-changing
terrorist threat, which is an apt description of what we are facing, it leads inevitably to the need for a
ÁH[LEOHDQGQLPEOHOHJDODQGSROLF\VWUXFWXUHWKDWFDQUHVSRQGDVWKHWKUHDWFKDQJHV,ZDQWWRUHÁHFW
a little bit on some of the changes that have occurred since September 11th. Talk big picture about
where we see the current threat and future threats down the line, but do so while keeping in mind
the necessity for the changing threat picture to be mirrored by the government’s ability to be equally
ÁH[LEOH
Since September 11th, I think there has been a sea change, and I agree with Ivan and Mike that
the U.S. government, in a way that would have been impossible to anticipate really, as a young prosecutor starting out prior to 9/11, really brought all tools to bear. And that means traditional prosecutor law enforcement tools, diplomacy, the skill sets of the authorities, and the intelligence community and the military. And now, in a way that just in part takes the legal and authorities change, but in
SDUWWDNHVWLPHIRUFXOWXUDOFKDQJHWRRFFXUWKHUHUHDOO\LVDXQLÀHGDFURVVWKHJRYHUQPHQWHIIRUWRQ
the terrorism front to prevent, disrupt and deter. In a way that I’m not sure all could have foreseen.
And there have been, as a result, numerous successes and lives saved because of terrorist attacks
that but for these changes would have occurred. In that sense, I think what Mike said towards the
conclusion of his remarks is true. It would be hard to predict how few lives have been lost since 911,
when you think about the climate that we’re in right after 9/11.
Yesterday the national security division had an event commemorating, for those of us in the
division, where we were since 911. We heard from the prosecutorial and FBI team that prosecuted
the Moussaoui case. In listening to it, it really brought you back to that time and the sense of fear
and uncertainty. The shock that it had occurred. In part they played clips from each of the victims
and they had a visual graphic up of the 3,000 victims. And they talked about how when they were
presenting the case, in the death penalty phase of the Moussaoui trial, they really tried and made a
conscious decision, no matter the resources to go without a prosecutor and FBI agents and treat
every single one of those victims as a victim of a homicide and give them the same type of process
and discussion that they would if they had gotten each of those cases individually. And that is still
is ringing in my head as I talk to you today and reminds us of why it is that we made these changes,
but also that we can’t rest on the changes that we’ve made. We need to continue to analyze the threat
and we need to continue to move and change and we can’t be a situation again where we make the
change after the fact, the threat.
I think the core al-Qaeda remains a capable organization that we treat with all seriousness and so
there’s been much talk about the degraded capability and I won’t disagree with that assessment. But
from most of us dealing day in and day out at the FBI, at the CIA, at the Department of Homeland
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Security, core al-Qaeda is still at the front of the mind every day when you’re in the morning briefLQJVDQGKHDULQJWKHWKUHDWSLFWXUHIRUWKDWGD\7KHDIÀOLDWHV:KDW,WKLQNZHDUHVHHLQJLVDFKDQJH
IURPZKHUHZHZHUHPRUHIRFXVHGVD\ÀYHVL[\HDUVDJRRQORQJWHUPFRUHDO4DHGDSORWVWKDW
ZHUHFRPSOH[DORQJWKHOLQHVRI 6HSWHPEHUWKQRZZH·UHSD\LQJHTXDODWWHQWLRQWRDIÀOLDWHJURXSV
like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), or Al Shabaab, who have declared their allegiance or
partnerships with core al-Qaeda, and other groups who may not have entered into a formal partnership or declared allegiance, but have similar goals or aims and cross-fertilizes some of the core alQaeda groups. The multiplicity of those groups makes our job more complex, although the hopeful
advantage is that we’ve disrupted that long term complex strategic planning from core al-Qaeda.
The other development that both Mike and Ivan touched on is the growth of home grown
violent extremists. In part that’s fueled by success in disrupting core al-Qaeda in causing this multiplicity of actors, but it’s also fueled, no doubt, by the Internet and the unique role that it now plays
in a way that messages that take place in a basement overseas in an international setting, are reaching our teenagers and our citizens here at home. And if you are inspired, it provides the stability for
GLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ7KDW·VYHU\GLIÀFXOWWRGLVUXSWEHFDXVHLW·VRFFXUULQJRQWKH,QWHUQHW,WKLQN
when you look at some of the plots that have either succeeded or we’ve disrupted, the Fort Hood,
or disrupted plots to blow up a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, several plots to attack military recruitment centers inside the U.S. There’s been an unprecedented level over the last
couple of years of terrorism disruptions inside the U.S. and a large number of those disruptions are
of home grown violent extremists. We’re seeing the number of people in that category grow and I
would expect, as we’re looking ahead at future threats, that that’s one that will continue to grow, we’ll
need to continue to monitor, and we’ll need to continue to come up with new ways to disrupt.
I completely agree with Ivan as to the threat of cyber and that when it comes to the cyber threat,
DOWKRXJKWKHUHKDVEHHQVLJQLÀFDQWSURJUHVV,NQRZWKH)%,KDVVWDUWHGWKLVJURXSWKH1DWLRQDO
Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, to bring together all the intel and law enforcement and military groups who are operational to focus each time there’s an attack on attribution. With cyber, one
RI WKHJUHDWGLIÀFXOWLHVWKDWRXUOHJDOIUDPHZRUNKDVQRWNHSWXSZLWKDQGZH·UHZRUNLQJWRGRVR
and similarly in our policy framework, is that at the outsight of a cyber attack you don’t know who
WKHDFWRULV$QGVR\RXUHDOO\QHHGWREOHQGWKHUHVRXUFHVDQGÀJXUHRXWLVWKLVWKHWHHQDJHKDFNHU
acting in the basement? Is this an organized criminal group? Is this a foreign nation state? Is this a
terrorist actor? Is this some type of hybrid? A terrorist group leveraging an organized criminal group
or leveraging a group of social hackers? And quickly try to determine, after the attack has occurred,
and this is more in Ivan’s lane, but similarly, we haven’t hardened our infrastructure in the cyber
arena to a place where most of us in government would like. And it’s an area where the threat will
continue to grow, our reliance on those systems continues to grow and our ability to respond needs
to keep pace.
I want to talk a little bit about structural changes that have occurred since 9/11. I think when it
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comes to combating the terrorist threat, great strides have been made in part by changing the legal
infrastructure. I won’t go into long detail about the changes in the PATRIOT Act and FISA, but
there has been success at tearing down the wall that existed between law enforcement and intelliJHQFH,·YHVHHQWKDWÀUVWKDQGERWKDWWKH)%,DQGDWWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI -XVWLFHZKHUHWKHROGFRQstruct that one needed to keep law enforcement investigations separate from intelligence that based
part on legal interpretation and existing law, but also on policy determination, has really changed.
And now the presumption is to share and groups are integrated and disrupting through the criminal
justice system is one tool to prevent, disrupt and deter terrorist attacks. But that’s what it is, a tool in
the arsenal. The most important thing is the objective of disrupting the attack and sharing the intelligence so that you can bring other tools to bear as well. Whether they’re diplomatic, or military, or
immigration authorities through DHS.
In addition to the legal change, there have been structural changes. My new position, in the
Department of Justice’s National Security Division, only came into existence in 2006 as a result of
a recommendation from the WMD commission. And what it was really designed to do is to take
advantage of the changes in the law and to place together the prosecutorial experience so that the
former counterterrorism and counterintelligence prosecutors that had worked within the Department of Justice with the intelligence professionals, who are not in the criminal division under the old
structure of the Department of Defense; and put them together in the same division and have the
focus be on the goal rather than the authorities that you’re using to achieve that goal. That structural
change, and other structural changes, like the creation of the NCTC and the Department of Homeland Security, they also helped, I think, to accomplish the cultural change. Where individuals who
used to work apart grew used to working together and to bringing the different - and it’s important because all of us are operating under the rule of law. But it’s a different set of legal authorities
and administrative authorities and you become expert in your way of looking at how to analyze a
problem based on the legal authorities that you have and the resources that you can bring to bear.
And until these structural changes occurred and then the concomitant changes in the culture, it was
GLIÀFXOWWREULQJWKRVHGLIIHUHQWYLHZSRLQWVWRJHWKHUWRVROYHWKHSUREOHPWKDWZHIDFHZKLFKZDV
preventing the attack.
I want to talk a little bit about outreach because while you’re doing this, many of the terrorist
threats for the past ten years, the violent extremist threats that you’re facing, are threats that affect
the Muslim and Arab communities inside the United States and other related communities. And
so an important part, I think, while this transition was occurring, in maintaining a goal of preventing the attack, is doing outreach to these communities. As part of that, within the Department of
Defense, the civil rights division as brought nearly 800 cases since September 11th against individuals who sought to violate the civil rights of members of the Arab and Muslim communities. It is
important to maintain that dialogue and that vigorous enforcement. In terms of privacy and civil
rights, I know it’s a mark of pride for the national security division at the Department of Defense
DQGIRUWKH)%,WKDWWKHFRPPLVVLRQLQLW·VÀQGLQJVRQHRI WKHUHDVRQVWKH\FKRVHRUUHFRP-
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mended, to keep the domestic intelligence function within the Department of Defense was a recognition of the department’s long standing adherence to the rule of law and it’s record of oversight in
that regard. We bear that as both a mark of pride and also part of our day-to-day responsibilities in
executing our authorities and in helping the other members of the intelligence community and our
partners exercise their authorities.
,QVKRUWFRQFOXVLRQDOWKRXJKZHFDQUHÁHFWDQGWDNHSULGHLQWKHSURJUHVVWKDWZH·YHPDGHZH
need to remain focused on the forward threat and we need to remain critical of the efforts that we’re
taking in case they need further reform.
DANIEL MARCUS: Okay, we’ll turn to the academics now and Professor Anderson.
PROFESSOR KEN ANDERSON: Well thank you and I’m delighted to take part in this. I’m
going to be very brief in part because Michael Leiter has already given the background to much of
what it is that I’m focused on here. And second, the other presentations have gone to parts that I am
simply not going to address, particularly the domestic part, the homeland security, these elements.
So, with an understanding that this is deliberately a very narrow part of all of this, I’d like to talk
for just a minute or two about the question of the use of force outside the United States. So what is
the role of the U.S. using force in wars and other kinds of things - but on an outside of the United
States basis.
Let me start this by going back to something again that Mike Leiter framed, which is speaking
DVDEXVLQHVVODZSURIHVVRUDQGVRPHERG\WKDWWHDFKHVFRUSRUDWHÀQDQFHWKHUHDUHPRPHQWVZKHUH
the right question is framed around what does the additional dollar of spending get me in terms
of being able to sell one more unit of iPods? One more iPhone? One more iPad? There are also,
similarly, points at which it makes sense to ask how much does this additional dollar of spending
purchase in terms of security or American lives saved or other people’s lives saved or any of these
questions. And that is that there are moments in which it makes sense to be speaking purely on the
margin. That is sort of smoothly rising or smoothly falling curves by which an additional unit results
in some other additional unit. There are limits to that however, which is that the nature of many
risks is that they are not smooth. They’re not continuous and there isn’t any relation between the
additional units spent and what you actually gain in the margin. And that has very important bearing
on the question of security and the use of force abroad, because most of the use of force abroad is
not really about that kind of marginal - we spend one more increment, we get this additional increment of something else. Most of it is actually premised on the idea that it’s a huge, huge mistake,
in terms of the long game that Mike Leiter, to wind up thinking about your activities from a relentlessly tactical serial standpoint.
One of the lessons I took after 9/11 was that the American people were not saying to the leadership that they should calculate how much additional spending we have to have in order to save an
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American life and tell me whether that’s greater than the amount that’s necessary in order to save
them from being struck by lightning. That, I don’t think, was the question or the demand or the
desire of the American people at that point. It was a strategic expectation that in some way or other
the game would be changed in some much more fundamental way. And I believe that the American
administrations heard that and went out and pursued the use of force abroad on exactly that kind
of expectation. So what was described as two land wars in Asia, plus part of that and also separate
from that, a massive counter-terrorism effort that apart from the land wars themselves, are all part
of an effort to get beyond the idea of what is on the one hand, a crucial function of government,
to wake up every morning and say how do I ensure that there is not going to be an attack at the
airport? How do I ensure that the plane is not going to come down? How do I ensure all of these
things on a serial day by day by day basis? But that cannot win at the strategic level if the expectation
is that people don’t want to live that way, where that’s the primary focus of their lives.
In that regard, then the question becomes what are the larger strategic elements? And which I’m
only focused on the question of use of force, I’m leaving aside larger questions of ideology and lots
of other things. What I think ten years on that we have learned from a strategic standpoint is that
regime change turns out to be very very important if you’re talking about a regime that as a regime
winds up harboring non-state terrorists, actor groups, al-Qaeda and related forces. Regime change
in failing states turns out to be marvelously easy because there’s not a lot of regime to change. And
at that point, then the question of use of force in a land war becomes, what do you do afterwards?
6RDVZH·YHVHHQLQ$IJKDQLVWDQDUHHIIRUWWKHUHEHFDPHFRXQWHULQVXUJHQF\2QWKHJURXQGÀJKWing over the very long term. And then a very large strategic question about what do we need to do
in order to achieve our overall aim that I think is really to change the nature of the security equation
from the standpoint of the United States.
We have told ourselves at various points that that requires that we establish democracy, the rule
of law, other sorts of institutional changes in Afghanistan. I believe that at some level. I also don’t
think that it’s achievable at another level. And I think that that’s the basic strategic encounter that
the Obama administration had to deal with as it came in and made it’s review of America’s wars.
And I believed that it’s reached something like that same conclusion. Desirable things are not always achievable things and that one has got to separate the question about what would be good in
Afghanistan from the question of what is minimally achievable that will be within the U.S. strategic
interest as far as counter-terrorism goes?
Now at this point I’m sounding almost exactly like Vice President Biden. And I think that that
probably is a fair description of the strategic posture regarding Afghanistan of the Obama adminLVWUDWLRQDQGLW·VRQHWKDW,WKLQNLVSUREDEO\ULJKW1DPHO\WKDWZH·UHQRWJRLQJWRÀ[$IJKDQLVWDQ
much beyond what it is now. That we are going to wind up withdrawing from counter-insurgency
and that we are going to focus on counter-terrorism. And that the focus on Afghanistan will become
the question of how do we wind up preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven once again
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for al-Qaeda or for other groups that might succeed it? And whether that requires a stable government, I think, is probably an open question in the minds of much of the leadership, because I’m not
sure that that can actually be achieved.
The question then becomes what happens in Pakistan and I will set that aside because I don’t
know the answer and I don’t think that anyone else does either. What we do see, however, is the
fragmentation and the proliferation, the movement of groups as they both seek new safe havens
in other places. Nigeria is next on the list. So in other words, as they move out further into other
places, then the question is what groups should be pursued and in what means? And again, leaving
aside all other possibilities let me end this by saying one thing about use of force. We have decided
that the primary tools of our projection of force are going to be at the level of special operations,
are going to be at the level of the use of drones, of JSOC, of counter-terrorism teams, of CIA and
what we can roughly describe as intelligence driven uses of force. I believe that that is actually right,
given where we are today and there will be a big question about where those things are used, what
their relationships to other kinds of tools of the projection of national power. Lots of questions like
that that I won’t attempt to answer.
But I do think that we’re going to see, at least as far as the use of force, that those are going to
be the tools that are the thin tip of the spear. The emphasis there ahs to be on intelligence driven,
meaning that one has to have the intelligence in order to be able to use the new technological marvels that we are coming up with. One of the things that I think is vastly not understood about the
nature of the drone campaign that goes on in Pakistan and in Afghanistan today is the extent to
which that depends upon having created, over a number of years, a genuinely serious intelligence
effort on the ground that is able to feed targeting information directly to who is it that you are
identifying to target. That’s a very long process in which the drone strike is the last kinetic moment
of a very very long intelligence build up before that. If we’re going to wind up using those kinds of
uses of force in other places, we’re going to have to contemplate the intelligence efforts necessary to
make those work.
Let me say one last thing about this which is I believe that we are, from a legal standpoint, in the
position of having to develop new rules at both the domestic level and to integrate them with what
our understanding of international law is on the question of what I have here described as intelligence driven uses of force. I don’t think that our legal rules at the domestic level and the way that
ZH·YHGHÀQHGFRYHUWDFWLRQDQGWKHZD\WKDWZH·YHGHÀQHGDFFRXQWDELOLW\IRULWRYHUVLJKWUHSRUWLQJ
WKRVHWKLQJVWUXO\ÀWWKHSLFWXUHRI ZKDWLWORRNVOLNHWRGD\:KLFKLVQRWPRVWRI WKHWLPHJHQXLQHO\
covert, but merely deniable. And in a world in which our uses of these kinds of force are really only
GHQLDEOHDWDSROLWLFDOOHYHOIRUSXUHO\ÀFWLRQDOSXUSRVHVWKHQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRI ZKDWZHQWRQKRZ
we inform about that, the nature of accountability and oversight has actually got to be re-examined.
$QGWKHQÀQDOO\WKHTXHVWLRQRI WKHLQFUHDVLQJLQWHJUDWLRQRI PLOLWDU\DQG&,$RSHUDWLRQVLQ
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this, I believe, will also require some further re-examination of the legal rules for those things. Dan,
I’ll leave it there.
DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Ken. Steve?
PROFESSOR STEPHEN VLADECK: Thanks. So I have the lucky or unfortunate privilege of
JRLQJODVW:KLFKPHDQV,JHWWKHVPDOOHVWDXGLHQFHEXWDOVRWKHFKDQFHWRUHÁHFWRQHYHU\ERG\HOVH
,·PJRLQJWRWU\WREHEULHI VRZHFDQJHWWR4 $,UHDOO\MXVWKDYHWKUHHTXLFNSRLQWVWRPDNH
Well, I hope they’re quick. And I’m sort of provoked by something that Michael Leiter said. I think
I wrote this down right. I think he said, “civil liberties have not been drastically infringed upon over
the past decade.” And since I’m the crazy leftie up here, I think it’s probably worth asking what he
meant by civil liberties and whose civil liberties he was referring to. The reason why I want to start
here is because even though our topic today is the changing nature of the terrorist threat, I think it’s
important to realize that whereas we’ve spent much of the last hour and a half talking about mistakes that have been bureaucratic, and diplomatic, and from a political standpoint, and how things
KDYHEHHQÀ[HGDQGLPSURYHGDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVUHDUUDQJHGDQGZKROHGHSDUWPHQWVVWRRGXSIURP
non-existence, there are other mistakes that we’ve made over the past ten years. Mistakes that are not
about which department is responsible for which action, but mistakes that are about individual civil
liberties. And I think as we’re considering the changing nature of the terrorist threat, we also have to
consider the changing nature of that threat as it relates to individual rights and accountability. And I
think that’s been what, at least in my mind, we haven’t spent a lot of time on so far today. So forgive
me, I’m going to spend a few minutes on it.
So let me sort of start with the proposition that civil liberties have not been drastically infringed
XSRQRYHUWKHSDVWGHFDGH6RÀUVW,WKLQNRI FRXUVHWKDWGHSHQGVRQZKRVHFLYLOOLEHUWLHVZH·UH
talking about. For non-citizen, well let me put it more bluntly, for twenty to thirty-nine year old
Muslim men who are non-citizens legally in the United States from countries in the middle east, I
think their lives have changed a lot over the last ten years. I think the odds that they are on various
government watch-lists, the odds that their neighbors look at them differently, the odds that for variRXVUHDVRQVWKHLUUHFRUGVDUHSHUXVHGPRUHIUHTXHQWO\E\UDQGRPSXEOLFDQGSULYDWHRIÀFLDOVKDYH
all increased. Now this may be hard to prove, it may not offend most of us, but I think it is still true.
$QG,WKLQNLW·VZRUWKUHÁHFWLQJRQWKDW
Second. Even if we worry about just we comfortable middle and upper middle class lawyers,
I think there are relevant ways to worry about how that’s also changed over the past ten years. For
example, before September 11th, it was against the law, there was a federal statute that made it a
crime, it was in Title 18 of the United States Code, to wiretap an individual without a court order. It
was in 18 U.S.C. § 2511, you can go look it up. It was also a violation of the federal telecommunications act for telecom providers to provide information about their callers and about their activities to
the government without a court order. That was the law. And that is no longer the law thanks to the

Vol. 2, No. 1

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

139

FISA Amendments Act of 2008. In the process of immunizing the telecom companies for whatever
role they played in the wiretapping program, Congress also changed the law going forward, so that
that would no longer be the case.
Two other quick examples. Material witness detention. Before September 11th, there was one
outlier example of a case where the government had used the federal material witness statute to
detain an individual in conjunction with an ongoing grand jury, as opposed to petty jury, proceeding.
Since 9/11, there have been dozens of reported examples, I can only imagine how many unreported
examples there have been. And indeed, when a U.S. citizen who was held, in his view, pretextually
XQGHUWKHPDWHULDOZLWQHVVVWDWXWHVXHGWRFKDOOHQJHLWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVDLGQRLW·VÀQHEHFDXVH
pretext doesn’t matter. I think that’s a change in the law since what was true before 9/11.
Subway searches. I have a hard time believing that before September 11th, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit would have no problem whatsoever saying that random suspicionless
searches of passengers entering the New York City subway system does not violate the 4th Amendment. Now, we all may be okay with the 2nd Circuit’s 2006 holding in MacWade vs. Kelly, 2006 U.S.
App. Lexis 20587 (2nd Cir. 2006), that the those searches are in fact permissible and they are in fact
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO7KDW·VÀQH0\SRLQWLVMXVWWKDWWKHODZKDVFKDQJHGDQGVRZHVKRXOGDFWXDOO\WDNH
seriously the very real ways in which the law has changed as it relates to individual rights.
All right. So that’s the sort of past. What has been going forward? How does this relate to a conversation about the changing nature of the terrorist threat? Well, one thought about a body that is in
a particularly good position to balance the need for new tools and for new authorities with individual
rights, is congress. And I think if we spent a lot of time talking about congress’ track record in this
regard over the past decade, it would be a very one sided conversation. So I mentioned already the
FISA Amendments Act. But let’s also talk about the actual scope of the war on terrorism. Congress,
in the authorization for the use of military force passed on September 18th, actually gave a relatively
XQGHUVWDQGDEOHVFRSHWRWKHFRQÁLFWLWZDVDXWKRUL]LQJ,WVD\VWKHSUHVHQFHDXWKRUL]HGWRXVHDOO
necessary and appropriate force against those persons, organizations or nations, I think, who are
responsible for 9/11. There was a tie to 9/11. Now that things are getting a little bit more differentiDWHGQRZWKDWZH·UHWDONLQJDERXWDIÀOLDWHGJURXSVDQGFREHOOLJHUHQWJURXSVDQGHYHQWDQJHQWLDOO\
DIÀOLDWHGJURXSV7KHUH·VDKDUGTXHVWLRQDERXWZKHWKHUWKH\WRRDUHHQFRPSDVVHGZLWKLQWKHRULJLnal scope.
Congress’ response is not to hold detailed hearings on how we think about the AUMF and how
should we expand it and what authority does the administration need. Congress’ response is to tuck
a very, very tiny provision into the National Defense Authorization Act, hold no hearings on it, and
then just assume that no one is going to notice that by expanding the detention authority to include
DQ\JURXSWKHSUHVLGHQWVD\VLVDIÀOLDWHGZLWKDO4DHGDLWLVDFWXDOO\H[WHQGLQJWKHVFRSHRI WKH
FRQÁLFW5LJKW",WKLQNWKDW·VDSUHWW\LPSRUWDQWWKLQJ&RQJUHVVUHOD[LQJSUH6HSWHPEHUWKEDUUL-
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ers. It’s generally true that the Constitution does not actually provide much in the way of protection
when it comes to privacy. In fact, before 9/11, most of the key privacy protections, the laws that
prevented businesses from talking to government, were statutory. Congress has relaxed those. Could
congress reinstitute them? Sure. Will they? Well, I leave that to you.
The Lone Wolf Provision. In the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001, Congress, at the Bush administration’s request, included authority to conduct certain kinds of wiretaps and surveillance on lone
ZROIV6RWKHVHDUHWHUURULVPVXVSHFWVZKRDUHQRWDWOHDVWFOHDUO\DIÀOLDWHGZLWKDQ\SDUWLFXODUWHUrorist organization. This was a critical power the Bush administration argued. When it expired, the
Obama administration also said this a really important authority; we really need it. And Congress
agreed and re-upped it again. Does any one know how many times the Lone Wolf Provision has
been used since 2001? If it’s less than one, you’ve won your prize. Zero, that’s right. So my point is
just that if we’re going to have this long term conversation about the changing nature of the terrorist threat, we should also be thinking about the other side of the coin, which is that if we’re going to
have these new authorities, if we’re going to have these new prerogatives, we should also think about
whether we should be also designing ways of insuring accountability.
Now, before I sort of shut up and get yelled at by everybody else, let me just say, I don’t in any
way mean to demean anyone who works on these issues from the executive branch position. I think
it is entirely understandable. And I think it was entirely understandable, even during the Bush adminLVWUDWLRQWKDWH[HFXWLYHEUDQFKRIÀFLDOVZLOOSXVKWKHHQYHORSH7KDWWKH\ZLOOWDNHZKDWHYHUDXWKRUity they have and use it to the best of their ability to protect individuals and the country at large. And
I think that is right. What we have to appreciate is that that’s going to be true and that even though,
as a policy matter, certain administrations may come out looking better, the law still counts. And we
still need legal restraints that are going to be enforced not just by the executive branch against themselves. So as the threat evolves over the next ten years, between now and September 11, 2021, I think
we also have to worry about how our statutory protections or civil liberties are also going to evolve.
Because otherwise, well, that’s a one-way ratchet. Thank you.
DANIEL MARCUS: Thank you Steve. Maybe we ought to start by giving our government ofÀFLDOVKHUHDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHVSRQGWR3URIHVVRU9ODGHFN
STEVE VLADECK: But not Professor Anderson? [Laughter]
IVAN FONG: Well, I’ll do both. So just a comment or two in response, really, on Professor
Anderson, not so much on the use of force outside the U.S., but the very good and important quesWLRQ\RXUDLVHDERXWFRVWVDQGEHQHÀWVWKDWDGGLWLRQDOGROODUVVSHQWRQVRPHWKLQJWKDWPD\FRXQWHU
WHUURULVPRUVRPHRWKHUHYHQWYHUVXVWKHEHQHÀWWKDWZHREWDLQDVDVRFLHW\7KDWLVDTXHVWLRQWKDW
we think about a lot. We have a duty to be faithful stewards of American taxpayer money; we are
DFFRXQWDEOHWR&RQJUHVV:HDUHVXEMHFWWRVLJQLÀFDQWRYHUVLJKWE\DQXPEHURI ERGLHVDQGVRLI IRU
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QRWKLQJHOVH,WKLQNZHGRQ·WZDQWWREHZDVWLQJPRQH\ZHGRQ·WZDQWWREHFRVWLQHIÀFLHQW7KH
challenge, and I’ve actually tried to promote some interdisciplinary conversation here, is that as you
IUDPHGLWLW·VGLIÀFXOWWRVSHFLI\RUDUWLFXODWHWKHWKLQJWKDWZHDUHEX\LQJDQGVROHWPHSURSRVHVRUW
of a thought, and unfortunately I’m not an expert in this area, so maybe those of you who are can
take this farther. I have consulted with insurance law experts, because it seems to me that the analogous area is spending money on insurance. You could argue that that’s wasted, because you never
JHWWKHEHQHÀWRI LW7KHUH·VDQLPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQWKRXJK,QVXUDQFHNLFNVLQDIWHUVRPHQHJDtive event occurs, and doesn’t count on what I call prevention costs. And so we all have our own - I
mean the hurricane is a great example. How much did you spend to mitigate the potential harm to
or fortify whatever, your windows or whatever. All of those costs also we go through in our own
PLQGVDELWRI FRVWEHQHÀW$QGRIWHQZHPD\VD\ZHOODIWHUWKHHYHQWLI LWGLGQ·WKDSSHQWKDWZDVD
waste. But ex ante really you can’t say that. And it’s afterwards when there’s been some terrible thing,
and people say, well you should have spent more, you could have done more. And those are very, in
my view, unfair sorts of perspectives because hindsight doesn’t take into account the risk that you
perceived before hand.
So the thought experiment that I try to invoke in these decisions is really spending money to
buy down risk. We face a risk landscape. Our job is to evaluate and assess the highest risk. And we
should be spending money in a cost effective way, buy down the highest risks and where it’s most
cost effective. A dollar spent to reduce this risk from 10 units to 2 units is worth a lot more than
spending of the same dollar to reduce another risk from .3 to .299. Yet, those comparisons are easy
to say in the abstract. In reality, should we spend more to prevent a nuclear WMD incident, a chemiFDODWWDFNDELRORJLFDODWWDFNDF\EHUDWWDFN"7KRVHDUHYHU\GLIÀFXOWDQG,FKDOOHQJHGRXUIULHQGV
DWWKH2IÀFHRI 0DQDJHPHQWDQG%XGJHW 20% ZKRDOVRDVNWKHVHTXHVWLRQVWRVD\WKDWIRU\RX
economists in the room, there is a Nobel Prize in economics for the person who comes up with a
theoretical framework for solving that kind of equation. So, I just want to say, it is a good question,
it is one we struggle with. It is one that I think conceptually we can understand in terms of how we
spend our money, but it’s very hard ex ante as opposed to ex-post to make those assessments.
With respect to civil liberties, you know I, of course, take very seriously, and we do at DHS, our
mission not only to help secure the homeland, but also to protect the rule of law, privacy and civil
rights. And I know you appreciate that there are a lot of people who are doing that. The point about
0XVOLP$PHULFDQVDQGWKH0XVOLPFRPPXQLW\LWLVDVLJQLÀFDQWHIIRUWDQGVXEMHFWRI RXWUHDFK
because those relationships are important. I would just distinguish between the impression you may
get, which is I don’t believe there are the sort of random suspicionless method of sort of perusLQJWKURXJKÀOHVDVRSSRVHGWRLQWHOOLJHQFHGULYHQVRUWRI ZHKDYHDSLHFHRI LQWHOOLJHQFHDERXW
a particular operative who may be traveling to the U.S. on a plane and the extent to which we can
LGHQWLI\SHRSOHZKRÀWWKHVSHFLÀFSURÀOH$QGWKHQQRWUHDOO\GRDQ\WKLQJRWKHUWKDQVXEMHFWWKHP
to greater secondary screening is, I think, a way to balance what I think is an important and prudent
approach of being risk driven and intelligence driven with the sort of broad brush. Everybody who

142

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 2, No. 1

looks a certain way, I think we are very clear in our guidance and in the training that we give to state
DQGORFDORIÀFLDOVWKDWLW·VYHU\LPSRUWDQWQRWWRVWHUHRW\SHRUHQJDJHLQUDFLDOSURÀOLQJ
The wiretap point you make, my familiarity with it actually isn’t that that the law has gone away,
EXWLW·VEHHQDPHQGHGWRDOORZWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOWRSHUVRQDOO\RUUHTXLUHDSHUVRQDOFHUWLÀFDWLRQ
before certain sharing of information takes place. And so I think the answer isn’t so much that it’s a
black and white prohibition, but that there are procedural safeguards in place.
And then the last point, I will violently agree with you on the role of Congress. [Laughter]. I
think it has been, in my position now for a little over two years, the mainstay of a lot of what I do is
GHDOZLWK&RQJUHVVDQGLWLVDYHU\GLIÀFXOWVLWXDWLRQ3DUWLFXODUO\JLYHQWKHQXPEHUVRPHRI \RXPD\
have seen, over a hundred congressional committees and subcommittees have oversight jurisdiction
RYHUWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI +RPHODQG6HFXULW\$QGLWPDNHVLWYHU\GLIÀFXOWWRVD\WKHOHDVWWRQRW
only be responsive, but to have clear guidance as to what priorities Congress wants.
I’ll add one more piece, which I think is an important part, which is the third branch. The judiFLDU\KDVSOD\HGDVLJQLÀFDQWUROH:HDOONQRZWKDWWKHODZWKDWFRPHVGRZQIURPFRXUWFDVHVWHQGV
to lag. And so to some extent, of course, they’re playing catch up and it makes it very hard when
thinking about prevention and trying to lean forward in what we are doing. But the good news, or
depending on our perspective I think, the news is that in general the government has been very successful in the litigation in which things like the advanced imaging technology at the airports has been
challenged on 4th Amendment grounds. An issue that we have had a bit of discussion internally, is
VHDUFKHVRI HOHFWURQLFPHGLDDWWKHERUGHU6RZKHQ\RXEULQJDODSWRSLQ\RXJHWDFRQÁXHQFHRI 
the government’s very clear and broad authority to search at the border versus what I think people
YLHZDVDODSWRSEHLQJYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPDÀOHFDELQHW<RXNQRZLI \RXZHUHZKHHOLQJDELJQRWHERRNRUÀOHFDELQHWDFURVVWKHERUGHUWKHUHZRXOGEHQRTXHVWLRQWKDWWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWFRXOG
VHL]HZLWKRXWVXVSLFLRQLQVSHFWDQGVHL]H\RXUÀOHFDELQHW%XWDPHPRU\VWLFNRUDODSWRSPD\EH
VXIÀFLHQWO\GLIIHUHQWLQNLQGWKDWWKHFRXUWVZLOOFRPHGRZQGLIIHUHQWO\%XWWKDW·VWKHNLQGRI TXHVtion that I think ultimately the executive branch, Congress, and the courts need to come to some
consensus on in order for all of these issues to be sorted out.
DANIEL MARCUS: John, do you want to add anything?
JOHN CARLIN: As a law student, you tend to think abstractly about the legal framework and
less about what goes into the day-to-day decision-making. I know from my time when I was at the
FBI, it was a shock at how limited the resources were. And when you think about the entire budJHWRI WKH)%,WKH\HDUO\EXGJHWLVVRPHZKHUHLQWKHRUGHURI ELOOLRQGROODUV7KHUHDUHURXJKO\
30,000 employees. That’s a big growth since 9/11. But when you consider the size of the United
States, and then the number of FBI agents is roughly in the order of 14,000. So it doesn’t compare
that well in some ways to large municipal police departments when you consider the scope of the
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responsibilities, not just in the counterterrorism or foreign intelligence realm, but civil rights and
public corruption, violent crime and gangs, drug offenses, and bank robberies. The scope of activity where the American public turns to the FBI and expects a solution is enormous compared to the
resources. So what does that do to the day to day? That means every day you make a decision, or an
agent makes a decision, on a particular case, or now that it’s Intelligence driven, that you analyze the
threats in a particular domain or area of the United States. You have to decide, where am I going to
apply those extraordinarily scarce resources given the scope of the population and the threats that
we face?
And in that sense, the resource constraints, there’s a happy marriage between the resource
constraints and those of us looking at the civil rights and civil liberties concerns. Because it would
be a terrible use of those resources to randomly check large communities or attempt to randomly
look at a U.S. person. Even if you were allowed to do it, and you had the legal structure in place and
authorities, which you do not, it would be a terrible use of resources and instead, I think the day-toGD\FKDOOHQJHLVWKHRSSRVLWH,W·VÀJXULQJRXWKRZZHWULDJHWKHDUWLFXODEOHWKUHDWVWKDWZH·UHUHFHLYing day in and day out, and decide of this vast volume of threats from the threat matrix of terrible
acts that we’re hearing chatter about, which one of these are the ones that are most likely to become
operational and where we should apply our scarce resources? And that is a decision that is extraorGLQDULO\GLIÀFXOWWRJHWULJKWDQGLVRQHWKDW,WKLQNKDVEHHQNH\DQGUHDOO\WKHFRUQHUVWRQHRI WKH
FBI’s transformation over the last ten years. Which is, we have these intelligence analysts, we share
the intelligence, we receive the intelligence, now how do we make those decisions on the application
of resources to disrupt. It goes to the risk analysis that Ivan was discussing.
Just on one - the Lone Wolf Provision. It’s one that has garnered a lot of attention, perhaps
because of the name. It’s ironic to me a little bit that it’s used as an example of a violation of civil
rights and civil liberties since, as the professor stated, it’s never been used. So in that sense, we can
breathe a sigh of relief that you have not been targeted. But it is an authority that if it were used, it
really goes to whether or not you could plead out that an individual was linked to a particular idenWLÀDEOHWHUURULVWJURXS6RWKHFRQFHUQLV\RX·OOKDYHDQLQFLGHQWZKHUH\RXFDQPDNHWKHVKRZLQJ
and it does require a showing, to Article III judges in court, in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, that you could make the showing that an individual falls within your foreign intelligence authorities. But you couldn’t show that they were linked to a particular group. It’s called the Moussaoui
problem and thankfully it’s not one that’s been confronted, but the thought was it was good to have
the authority. If we did use it, it’s one where the - it also goes from the FBI to the National Security
Division, the application would have to be approved. It then goes to the court, the court would have
to approve it, and then after it was used, you’d have to report its use back to Congress.
So I think there are areas where receiving additional guidance or clarity from Congress would be
appreciated. I’m not sure if Lone Wolf is, although it’s important I think to plan for that possible
eventuality, I think it’s probably received too much attention.
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STEVE VLADECK: Although in that sense, right, it might just be that it’s a metaphor? And
that the metaphor is - I mean this is after the point I was trying to make and I think both of your
responses helpfully illustrates it. Which is that from the perspective of the executive branch, the
position rightly is we haven’t used these authorities and therefore there is nothing to worry about.
We have been faithful, we have not crossed these lines, we are not doing random stuff because of
resource constraints or other reasons. And from my crazy academic perspective, that’s wonderful,
but it’s a political constraint, not a legal one. It’s a constraint that is only as good as the circumstances that allow it to exist.
As the threat evolves over time, and as things change and as there are new crises, the fact that
these authorities are out there, whether or not they’ve been used, is what gives me pause and is what
I think we should be addressing. To paraphrase Justice Jackson, it’s the loaded weapon. Responsible
H[HFXWLYHEUDQFKRIÀFHUVZLOORQO\VKRRWWKHORDGHGZHDSRQZKHQWKH\KDYHWREXWP\FRQFHUQLV
about making sure we understand when the weapon is there.
IVAN FONG: If I could also just reply. I think you may underestimate the power of the statePHQWE\WKHVHQLRUOHJDORIÀFLDOVLQWKHGHSDUWPHQWWKDWVRPHWKLQJLVXQODZIXO6RLI \RXUSRLQWLV
that, do we prosecute people or do we not indemnify them when they cross the line? That I will
leave to others, but I can tell you from personal experience, that I wouldn’t even call it pressure, I
think there is a sense of shared mission. That people come to these agencies because they are dedicated to the mission. When I do recruiting or when I meet the lawyers, I often ask them, why did
you come to work for DHS? And maybe I shouldn’t be surprised, but at least in the beginning I was
very surprised that a very common answer, maybe in more than half the occasions, people would
say, “9/11 affected me in ways that I can’t describe and I resolved to myself that I wanted to do
something about it and I’m a lawyer, so I applied for a job at DHS, and here I am.”
Everyday when we respond to various crisis and people work late into the evening, overnight,
over the weekends to respond to hurricanes, earthquakes, I see that everyday. And the point is really
not that we’re so blinded by the mission that we ignore the rule of law. But that people do take seriously, and I can’t go into the internal deliberations, but there are many - it is the rule, not the exception, that the lawyers will say, I’m sorry you’re about to cross the line or if you were to go there, it
ZRXOGUDLVHVLJQLÀFDQWOLWLJDWLRQULVN$QGLI ZHH[SODLQWRWKHPZKDWWKDWULVNLVDQGZK\ZHZLOO
KHOSWKHPÀQGDPXFKEHWWHUSDWKWRDFFRPSOLVKZKDWWKH\ZDQWWRGR6R\RXPD\FDOOLWSROLWLFDO,
view it as the shadow of the law. I mean this is what happens everyday in the executive branch where
lawyers are giving advice and people who are policy makers or operators actually follow the advice.
It’s the very rare occasion, and sometimes you do hear about when people go above or behind or
beside the lawyers and they’re the ones that get in trouble. And we are very fond of pointing that out
to people.
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STEVE VLADECK: So we’re going to have the Libya conversation next week? [Laughter]
DANIEL MARCUS: The problem sometimes of course is that the legal advice, as we saw arguably some years ago with respect to torture, may not have been the correct advice. But I agree with
Ivan that there is great effort to preserve the rule of law within the executive branch, but of course
the legal advice has to be the right advice.
We’ve run out of time. I would like to - and everyone should feel free to leave - do you have to
OHDYH"<RXKDYHDERXWÀYHPLQXWHV"$OOULJKW,ZRXOGOLNHWRJLYHDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUSHRSOHWRDVN
questions, and I sure have a couple.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Over the past ten years it seems that the U.S. has looked to certain
events in its foreign capacity only as to how they relate to its foreign policies, i.e. the United States
has seemed to really look at how the death of Bin Laden will change what our Afghanistan policy
should be without changing our Iraq policy. I don’t see any evidence that the domestic agencies have
done the same kind of analysis about the real scope of this threat and that instead you have a kind
of rhetorical conversation between the World Trade Center, 9/11 and the threat of home grown extremists. They don’t seem equivalent to me, in any respect, and, which is not to say that they’re not,
that it’s not serious, but they’re not equivalent. The 9/11 Commission recommendations were about
what could we have done and what wasn’t done to prevent the next kind of massive attack from
overseas? And you’ve done a lot of things that we’ve asked, but now, you’re talking about something
internally, and it seems to me that the government has to failed to do the same. For instance, in
having 72 Fusion Centers when I think the likelihood of a massive terrorist attack, I hope, is pretty
low. The costs in terms of an increase in government power and authority, which is there to be used
when times get tough and the next administration is tempted to use it and the costs, of course, in
terms of money, when we have - I mean every dollar is not only a question of which FBI agent is
going to what, but which food stamp program is going to get cut because the security apparatus is
so large? And lastly, it is not clear to me that there has really been an analysis of the effectiveness of
the changes in domestic counterterrorism landscape in preventing domestic incidents. And it’s reassuring that there have been so few, but it doesn’t prove that what you’ve been doing is correct. And
that analysis simply hasn’t been done.
DANIEL MARCUS: Who wants to take that on? [Laughter]
JOHN CARLIN: In terms of the threat posed by home grown violent extremists and how
seriously it should be taken by the FBI, the Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland
Security, I do think this is an area where you look to the executive branches accountable ultimately to
the people. Listen carefully to our oversight from the hill, and I throw it back a little bit on what are
the expectations and what is the task? So currently I think it’s very clear that the number one priority
is to prevent terrorist attacks, regardless of the perpetrator, inside the United States. That is also the
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number one priority of the Department of Justice. Clearly, and that includes both international terrorists and domestic terrorists and it certainly includes homegrown violent extremists. I think many
of us remember Oklahoma City and the type of damage that was caused in that case by a violent
extremist who was a domestic terrorist. And I think if we’ve seen some of the domestic response to
a couple of events over the past two years. The tragic loss of life at Fort Hood and the failed attempt to blow up an airliner by Abdulmutallab. And the reaction and response that we received in
my former seat at the FBI, indicated expectations were high. That it was unacceptable to come that
near to a success in the case of Abdulmutallab. I think similar criticism in Times Square. And in Fort
Hood it was unacceptable that any attack had occurred at all. There was an extensive investigation by
multiple congressional committees. there was a White House driven interagency extensive investigaWLRQDVWRZKDWKDGJRQHZURQJDQGZKDWFRXOGEHÀ[HG$QGWKHPHVVDJHZDVFOHDUWKDWDOWKRXJKLW
may be impossible to assure 100 percent safety from a terrorist attack, that that is and should remain
our goal. And that every day we should be doing everything we can within our existing authorities,
ever mindful of our obligation to the rule of law and civil liberties to prevent those attacks from occurring.
It is not up, I don’t think, to the - it’s important for the executive branch agencies such as the
FBI and the Department of Justice and DHS, to attempt to execute according to their authorities
and the expectations until told otherwise. And so, that will remain our number one goal. I won’t give
my personal opinion as to whether we should attempt to stop home grown violent extremists from
committing terrorist attacks inside the United States ranging from shooting up pedestrian malls or
along the line of what we saw in Mumbai, or using improvised explosive devices, but I will say that
currently, that’s our goal and our drive each day, is to prevent that from occurring and I certainly
don’t think that’s outside the bounds of what we should be doing.
DANIEL MARCUS: You want to add anything quickly?
IVAN FONG: I want to add a couple of points. I wanted to mention or respond to this point
about countering violent extremism and this distinction between home grown and foreign. I think
those concepts are elusive. I think there are important differences to be sure, but we are increasingly
seeing an evolution of the threat so that the border is making less of a difference. I think John alluded to the frequency with which we see the Internet being a medium for communication and that
the transnational nature of some of the operations. So I would hesitate to say that they are completely different, not am I saying that they are identical. I think they share some similarities and that I
think it’s important to treat it as spectrum as opposed to two distinct categories.
I also want to say that the increase in authorities I think does result from the evolving threat.
That as the threat evolves, as the landscape changes, the folks that are tasked everyday to prevent
and to deter, need to have different authorities. We engage in that very public debate, for example,
in the cyber security arena, where because of the evolving threat, I think you have seen both the
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administration and others propose legislation to clarify some of the authorities.
The last point to respond to, this very important question that’s been a bit of a theme, has it
been worth it? I saw a statistic the other day. The DHS budget is about 3.5 percent of the overall
federal budget. I leave it to you to decide whether that’s too much, too little, you know, enough, not
enough. But I think we sometimes have this impression that we are spending an inordinate amount
of money. We are spending a lot of money, don’t get me wrong, but we are also spending money in
lots of other very important priorities that this country has and to me, I’ll interject my own personal
view. 3.5 percent doesn’t strike me as being unduly high.
DANIEL MARCUS: Okay. I think, while I know there are more questions, and I have some
questions, I think we really have run out of time and people have to leave. So I’m going to call it
quits. Thank you everyone for coming and please join me in thanking our exceptional panel.
[Applause]

